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ABSTRACT 
In the first essay, we examine the link between CEOs political ideology – conservatism – 
and their firms’ investment decisions. We focus on the effect of CEO conservatism on M&A 
decisions. Our evidence indicates that politically conservative CEOs are less likely to engage in 
M&A activities. When they do undertake acquisitions, their firms are more likely to use cash as 
the method of payment, and the target firms are more likely to be public firms and to be from the 
same industry. Conditional on the merger, CEO conservatism appears to have a significantly 
positive impact on long-run firm valuation. However, we find no evidence that conservative CEOs 
create value in the short run. All our results hold after controlling for CEO overconfidence. In the 
second essay, we investigate the impact of difference in local political ideologies between 
acquirers and targets on the likelihood of deal completion and announcement returns over the 
period of 1981-2009. We posit that increase in political ideology distance between acquirer and 
target leads to greater risks/costs associated with the integration process. This increase in distance 
is less likely to allow for the completion of deals and elicit less favorable market response to 
merger announcements. We find that when political ideology distance between acquirer and target 
in a merger are minimal, deals are more likely to be completed. We also find that acquirer which 
are politically proximate to their targets earn significantly higher returns than distant acquirers. 
After controlling for the geographic effect and other determinants of announcement returns, the 
political ideology effect still exists. Overall, the evidence suggests that corporate political ideology 
plays an important role in completing deals and determining announcement returns.  
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ESSAY 1. 
The Effect of CEO Conservatism on Merger and Acquisition Decisions 
 
1. Introduction 
A growing literature has examined individual as well as corporate financial decisions in the 
context of a phenomenon known as “behavioral consistency,” the notion that individuals’ 
preferences, attitudes, and personal traits can translate consistently across various choice problems. 
For example, Cronqvist, Makhija and Yonker (2011) document the behavioral consistency of 
CEOs’ leverage choices in the mortgages of their primary residences and the debt ratios of their 
firms. Bonaparte, Kumar and Page (2010), Hong and Kostovetsky (2012),  and Jiang, Kumar and 
Law (2011) show that personal political preferences indeed have a significant influence on the 
investment decisions of individual investors and professional money managers, as well as on the 
forecasts of equity analysts. Similarly, Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) point out how CEO overconfidence can adversely impact their firms’ capital expenditures 
and M&A decisions while Bertrand and Schoar (2003) analyze how other characteristics of CEOs, 
such as age, education, and region, can also affect their corporate decisions.   
More recently, Hutton, Jiang and Kumar (2013) test whether the personal political ideology of 
CEOs influences the level of financial conservatism in their firms. Their evidence is consistent 
with the notion that CEOs with Republican orientation, who are generally viewed as following a 
politically more conservative ideology, would also make financially more conservative decisions 
for their firms. Their results show that firms with Republican CEOs exhibit more conservative 
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corporate policies with lower leverage ratios, lower capital and R&D expenditure, less risky 
investment, higher dividend payouts, and greater profitability.  
This paper extends the work of Hutton, et al. (2013) by examining the effect of CEO political 
conservatism on the merger and acquisition (M&A) decision of their firms. As in Hutton, et al. 
(2013) and similarly in Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), we use CEOs’ personal political 
contributions to identify their political orientations, and thereby to assess the degree of their 
political and fiscal conservatism. Linking the personal ideology of CEOs and their M&A decisions 
is important because acquisitions are among the most significant investment decisions the CEOs 
make, which can have a substantial impact on their shareholder wealth.  
To empirically examine the effect of CEO conservatism on M&A decisions, we compile a 
sample of 1,007 publicly traded U.S. firms and 2,100 CEOs that are covered by the COMPUSTAT 
Execucomp with 12,928 CEO-year observations between 1993 and 2006. Our test contributes to 
the literature by shedding light on how CEO conservatism affects (1) the firm’s choice of 
acquisition (external investment) over capital expenditure (internal investment), (2) the acquirer’s 
choice of payment method (cash vs. stock), type of target (public vs. private firm), and deal type 
(focus increasing vs. diversification), and (3) the market’s reaction to the M&A announcement and 
the long-run performance of the acquiring firm.   
First, we test how likely conservative CEOs are to engage in mergers. We find that 
conservative CEOs are significantly less likely to engage in M&A activities. The results are robust 
after controlling for other CEO characteristics, such as CEO age, tenure, and gender, as well as 
standard M&A determinants namely, Tobin’s q, size, free-cash-flow, leverage, R&D and capital 
expenditure, and industry concentration level. We use firm and year fixed effects to remove the 
within-firm and time effects. Our evidence is consistent with the view suggested in the previous 
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literature (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway (2003); Wilson (1973a); Kish, Netterberg and 
Leahy (1973)) that conservative individuals exhibit a strong disposition to preserve the status quo 
and are less likely to seek strong external stimulation and to engage in sensation-seeking behavior. 
Our results indicate that this behavioral consistency of conservatives extends to their corporate 
investment/M&A decisions.  
Using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), we further test conservative CEOs’ choice of 
acquisition (external investment) over capital expenditure (internal investment). We find that 
conservative CEOs are negatively associated with external investment (M&A), but positively 
associated with internal investment (capital expenditure) after controlling for firm-level 
investment opportunity (Tobin’s q) and industry concentration level. Their choice can be explained 
by the higher degree of uncertainty and asymmetry information in the environment surrounding 
external investment (M&A) addressed in Harford and Li (2007). 
Regarding whether conservative CEOs prefer stock or cash as the method of payment for 
acquisitions, we find that they are significantly less likely to choose stock as a payment method. 
Gilson (1986) documents that stock payments lead to substantial offer delays in the United States 
due to security registration and shareholder approval requirements. Fishman (1989) argues that 
cash enables more rapid deal completion, thus lessening the risk of competitive bids. Furthermore, 
holding the acquisition price constant, using cash lowers the likelihood of bid rejection by target 
management and a competitive bid. Since using stock as the payment method would increase the 
uncertainty of successful completion of the deal, conservative CEOs are therefore less likely to 
use this payment method, and our evidence is consistent with this prediction.  
CEOs with a conservative ideology are also significantly more likely to choose focus-
increasing M&As. Glasgow and Cartier (1985) argue that conservatives tend to prefer familiar 
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stimuli over unfamiliar stimuli. They are also more sensitive to the possibility of a loss. 
diversifying M&As are shown to have a negative response to the announcement (Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1988)) while similarly diversified firms too are seen to exhibit a diversification 
discount on valuation [Berger and Ofek (1995); Lang and Stulz (1994); Rajan, Servaes and 
Zingales (2000)]. Conservative CEOs are therefore more likely to acquire within-industry targets 
to the extent that their sensitivity to unfamiliar stimuli and the potential loss from diversifying 
merger is greater than non-conservative CEOs.  
We also find that conservative CEOs are less likely to choose private targets and more likely 
to choose public targets. One possible explanation for the finding could be the difference in 
information availability on private/subsidiary and public targets. Less information on private 
targets makes the value of assets highly uncertain; this causes conservative CEOs to favor to 
acquire public targets.  
To address the question of whether conservative CEOs add value to the firms by undertaking 
acquisitions, we analyze the market’s reaction to M&A announcements. We find no statistically 
significant difference in market response to the announcement by firms with conservative or non-
conservative CEOs in multivariate regression test. One possible reason for this finding is that 
M&A decisions made by CEOs with conservative ideology could be suboptimal in their decision 
making process. In Table 2 we document that conservative CEOs are less likely to use stock as the 
payment method (positive to the announcement returns), are more likely to conduct focus-
increasing M&A (positive to the announcement returns), and are more likely to acquire public 
targets (negative to the announcement returns).  
In particular, acquiring public targets could be a suboptimal decision in creating firm value. In 
conservative CEO perspectives, acquiring public targets is a safe choice due to As argued in Fuller, 
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Netter and Stegemoller (2002), due to the lack of liquidity in private and subsidiary targets, 
acquiring such firms can result in positive announcement returns. However, information on private 
and subsidiary targets is generally more opaque and is less available than public targets. Thus, 
given the preference for greater uncertainty avoidance, CEOs with conservative ideology are more 
likely to prefer acquiring public targets, resulting in negative market response.  
Interestingly, the analysis of long-term performance indicates that conservative CEOs add 
values to their firms. Over the five-year period of a post-M&A announcement, stocks of firms with 
conservative CEOs outperform those with non-conservative CEOs by 20.73% (significant at the 
5% level). This finding is consistent with the result in Hutton, et al. (2013) that firms run by 
conservative CEOs have better operating performance. It is possible that more cautious 
management by conservative CEOs results in fewer mistakes and hence better performance.  
We perform robustness checks for all our results, for example, by controlling for CEO 
overconfidence. Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that management overconfidence is an 
important aspect of CEO behavioral bias that has a significant impact on a firm’s investment 
decisions. We show that our results remain unchanged after controlling for CEO overconfidence. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the hypotheses 
concerning the effect of CEO conservatism on mergers. In Section 3, we describe the data and   the 
conservatism measures. Section 4 presents the empirical results and their interpretations. We 
conclude in Section 5. 
2. Hypotheses 
The basic premise of our analysis is that CEOs’ political conservatism is correlated with their 
conservatism when making their firms’ financial and investment decisions. Carney, Jost, Gosling 
and Potter (2008) show that left-right differences in ideologies exist and are related to their relative 
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openness to changes versus the preservation of traditional values.  Jost, et al. (2003) argue that 
conservatives exhibit a strong disposition to preserve the status quo while liberals are more willing 
to embrace changes and seek novelty. In particular, conservatives are less likely to seek strong 
external stimulation [Wilson (1973b)], less open to unconventional views [Jost and Thompson 
(2000)], less likely to engage in sensation seeking behaviors [Kish, et al. (1973)], and more 
cautious about making major changes in life (Feather 1979). 
 In addition, external (M&A) and internal investment (capital expenditure) decisions are the 
choice of CEOs since they are similar way of adding to a firm’s asset base and productive capacity. 
Andrade and Stafford (2004) analyze industry patterns in M&A and internal investments (Capital 
expenditure) and find that M&A, like internal investment(Capital expenditure), are a means for 
firms to improve their capital base, in reponse to growth opportunity measured by Tobin’s q and 
sales growth. However, Harford and Li (2007) report that the CEO treats internal investment 
(Capital expenditure) and M&A differently and argue that the incentives to undertake each differ 
as well due to the uncertainty and information in the environment surrounding a M&A.  
Given these observations, we expect that politically conservative CEOs are more likely to be 
conservative in making financial decisions for their firms. Thus, this type of CEOs would be less 
likely to undertake major investment decisions such as mergers and acquisitions for their firms, 
and favor internal investment (capital investment) over external investment (M&A).   
Hypothesis 1: CEOs who are politically conservative are less likely to engage in acquisitions 
than CEOs who are less conservative. 
The M&A literature has documented negative announcement returns for acquirer’s stocks in 
stock-finance mergers [e.g., Servaes (1991); Travlos (1987)]. In fact, the acquiring firms’ poor 
stock performance goes beyond the announcement period. Agrawal, Jaffe and Gershon (1992b) 
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document that post-acquisition stock returns are lower for acquisitions that are stock-financed than 
those that are cash-financed. Linn and Switzer (2001) find that acquiring firms experience 
significantly worse industry- and size-adjusted operating performance for up to five years 
following the acquisition. Now, if conservatives are more sensitive to the possibility of a loss  as 
argued in Wilson (1973b), it is reasonable to expect that conservative CEOs would be more 
sensitive to potentially poor stock performance and hence would be less likely to choose stock as 
the method of payment for acquisitions.  
Moreover, Wilson (1973b), Gillies and Campbell (1985), and McAllister and Anderson (1991) 
point out that conservatives also exhibit greater aversion to ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity. 
While stock payments is documented in Gilson (1986) to have led to substantial offer delays in the 
United States, due to security registration and shareholder approval requirements, cash is shown 
by Fishman (1989) to enable more rapid deal completion and thereby lessen the risk of competitive 
bids. Martin (1996) also find that stock offers are more likely to be used than cash if there more 
uncertainty about the target. Holding the acquisition price constant, paying cash also lowers the 
likelihood of bid rejection by target firms. Thus, our second hypothesis predicts that conservative 
CEOs are less likely to choose stock as the payment method.   
Hypothesis 2: Conservative CEOs are less likely to use stock as the method of payment than 
less-conservative CEOs. 
There are many explanations for the different market reaction to the M&A with the different 
type of target[Chang (1998), Hansen and Lott (1996), and Fuller, et al. (2002)].  Particularly, Fuller, 
et al. (2002) argue that private targets are associated with positive announcement returns due to a 
liquidity effect for private/subsidiary target. The lack of liquidity on those targets makes the 
investments less attractive, resulting in price discount. Thus, with the higher sensitivity to the 
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possibility of a loss [Wilson (1973a)], we can conjecture that conservative CEOs more likely favor 
to acquire private target. However, information about private and subsidiary targets is generally 
more opaque and is less available than public targets(information effect). Thus, given the 
preference for greater uncertainty avoidance, CEOs with conservative ideology are more likely to 
prefer acquiring public targets. Collectively, conservative CEOs’ choice of type of target is not 
clear.  
Hypothesis 3: Conservative CEOs are more likely to acquire public (Private) target if 
information effect for public target is greater (smaller) than liquidity effect 
for private/subsidiary target. 
Ruth Glasgow, Cartier and Wilson (1985) argue that the conservatives also prefer familiar 
versus unfamiliar stimuli. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) find that diversifying M&A have 
negative (value-destroying) announcement returns. Other studies also document diversification 
discounts [Berger and Ofek (1995); Lang and Stulz (1994); Rajan, et al. (2000)]. If conservative 
CEOs indeed prefer familiar stimuli and are more sensitive to poor performance, we expect that 
they are more likely to engage in focus-increasing rather than diversifying acquisitions by pursuing 
within-industry targets.  
Hypothesis 4: Conservative CEOs are more likely to acquire targets that are in the same 
industry. 
Hutton, et al. (2013) provide evidence that managerial conservatism is a determinant in 
corporate financing, payout, and investment decisions. They report that CEOs with conservative 
ideology have lower level of leverage (financing policy), higher level of dividend payout (payout 
policy), higher level of profitability (operating side), and tend to avoid risky investment (less 
investment in capital expenditure and even less investment in R&D expenditure). They argue that 
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the cautious financing decision and operating style leads firms less risky and more profitable 
whereas conservative investment policy may be costly to shareholders and then conclude that the 
impact of these policy choices on firm valuation is not clear.  
However, many M&A studies document the major determinants of short term firm valuation 
(announcement returns) such as method of payment, type of target, and within-industry M&A, 
which are the CEOs’ choices. As such, we can examine the impact of their policy choices on firm 
valuation. In general, cash offers are associated with greater abnormal announcement returns than 
stock offers [Travlos (1987), Fishman (1989), Brown and Ryngaert (1991)]. Hansen and Lott 
(1996) and Fuller, et al. (2002) report that acquiring private generates higher announcement returns. 
Also Comment and Jarrell (1995) find that increase in focus is consistent with shareholder wealth 
maximization. Thus, the short term firm value created/destroyed by M&A will be contingent on 
CEOs’ choices (cash: (+), private (public):+(-), focus-increasing: (+)). Regarding long term firm 
valuation, due to their conservative managing style, M&A made by conservative CEOs will 
outperform those by non-conservative CEOs.  
 Hypothesis 5: The announcement returns will be conditional on their determinant choices, 
but M&A made by CEOs with conservative ideology will outperform those by 
non-conservative CEOs due to the managing style in the long run.  
3. Data 
We draw the initial sample of CEOs from the Compustat Executive Compensation 
(Execucomp) database, which primarily covers firms in the S&P 1500 index from 1993 and 2006. 
Execucomp provides the full name, title, position, age, gender, and “Became CEO” date to 
compute their tenure of being the top executive for each fiscal year. Then we use the CEO 
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information from Execucomp to identify the CEO’s political contributions recorded by the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC).  
We match the CEO’s personal and political information obtained from ExecuComp and FEC 
with the M&A database. Securities Data Company (SDC) is used to obtain announcement dates 
and merger financing information for completed deals by our sample firms. We require that the 
acquiring firm obtains at least 51% of the target’s shares (and hence control). We also require that 
the deal size be greater than $1 million. This criterion is important because acquisitions of small 
targets may not require active involvement of the acquirer’s CEO. We exclude acquisitions where 
the targets are not either private or subsidiary. Firm-level accounting variables are obtained from 
COMPUSTAT (See Appendix for the definitions of variables). The Fama-French industry group 
information comes from Professor Kenneth French’s data library. This procedure generates 1,007 
firms, 2,100 CEOs and 12,928 CEO-year combinations.   
Following Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), Hutton, et al. (2013), and others, we use CEO’s 
political contributions to Republican and Democratic senate, house, presidential candidates and 
party committees in political campaigns to determine their political affiliations. Individual 
donation data is obtained from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) website (www.fec.gov) 
from 1993 and 2006. Corporate CEOs can make contributions to political candidates or party 
committees either directly or indirectly. They can make contributions directly to candidates or 
party committees. They can also contribute indirectly through their companies’ Political Action 
Committees (PACs). We use the direct contributions by CEOs to identify their political orientation 
because company PACs usually make simultaneous contributions to both parties [Cooper, Gulen 
and Ovtchinnikov (2010)]. 
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To identify the political preferences of CEOs, we create the tenure-specific Republican dummy 
measure for each CEO. This dummy variable identifies strong Republican CEOs during their 
tenures. It takes the value of one if the CEO’s political contributions during his/her entire tenure 
is all toward the Republican Party, and of zero if otherwise. The fact that this measure does not 
vary during the sample period captures the idea that party identification is developed and 
established in one’s earlier years adolescence or early adulthood and remains fairly stable during 
the adult life [Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002)] . Our measure of CEO political orientation 
also eliminates the potential noise that could be introduced by varying party popularity at given 
years. 
We also construct an alternative index variable for party orientation, which is defined as the 
difference between a CEO’s political contributions to the Republican Party candidates (or its 
committees) and those to the Democratic Party (or its committees) divided by the CEO’s total 
contributions to both parties during his/her entire tenure. As in Hutton, et al. (2013), the measures 
here are based on self-revealed preferences (e.g., political donations) of CEOs and can therefore 
capture their embedded political identities and ideologies which they subscribe.  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our sample. Panel A shows the differences in firm-
specific and CEO-specific variables across CEOs. First, we examine the tendency of conservative 
CEOs on investments. As shown in Panel A, the M&A dummy shows that a lower proportion of 
CEOs with conservative ideology (44% of conservative CEOs) engages in M&A activities than 
non-conservative CEOs (47% of non-conservative CEOs).  However, firms with conservative 
CEOs have, on average, a larger amount of capital expenditures compared to those with non-
conservative CEOs. The initial finding is consistent with our first hypothesis that conservative 
CEOs are less likely to engage in M&A because of greater uncertainty and greater information 
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asymmetry surrounding M&A, but they do prefer internal over external investments holding fixed 
their investment opportunities and industry competition levels [see Andrade and Stafford (2004)].  
We next check the operating performance of firms. Hutton, et al. (2013) find that firms with 
conservative CEOs have higher profitability. Consistent with their findings, firms with 
conservative CEOs in our sample also have higher profitability, higher operating margin, and 
higher ROA than those with non-conservative CEOs. In our sample, firms with conservative CEOs 
have higher leverage. This is inconsistent with the finding in Hutton, et al. (2013). A possible 
explanation could be that firms with conservative CEOs in our sample have more tangible assets, 
enabling them to borrow more at lower costs.  Panel B presents the pairwise correlations between 
the conservative CEO measure and other CEO characteristics. The correlations are lower than 0.1 
but CEO age displays higher than 0.1. We will control for CEO age in our estimations to prevent 
their direct effects from contaminating our results. 
4. CEO Conservatism and Acquisitions 
To see whether CEOs’ individual traits may influence their investment decisions, our main 
empirical analysis concerns the link between their personal ideology and their firms’ investment 
choices. To address the question, we first investigate whether CEOs’ preferences for internal vs. 
external investment, and in the event of acquisitions, their choices of payment method, target type, 
and deal characteristics (focus-increasing vs. diversification). 
4.1. Merger Frequency 
To test the first hypothesis, we use the following probit regression specification: 
Pr{𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝐶𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡} = 𝐺(𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡𝐵)   (1) 
Y in the Eq. (1) is a dummy variable where 1 signifies that the CEO engages in M&A in a 
given year. C stands for the conservatism measure for CEOs. X is a set of control variables. G 
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stands for the logistic distribution. In estimating Eq. (1), we use two proxies for C, both the dummy 
and the index variable.  
Table 2 reports two sets of results related to the first hypothesis. In model (1) and (2), using 
the probit model described above, we test how likely conservative CEOs engage in M&A 
controlling for CEO age, tenure, founder, and gender. At the firm level, we include the following 
controls: size of acquirer, Tobin’s q (control for investment opportunity), free cash flow (measure 
of internal resource), leverage, capital expenditure, R&D expenditure, Herfindahl index (measure 
of industry competition), and a dummy variable for high tech industry. We also include industry 
and year fixe effect to control for within-industry variations and time trends in the likelihood of 
M&A. 
The effect of CEO conservatism on merger frequency appears to be negative after including 
the controls and firm and year-fixed effects with standard errors robust to two-dimensional 
clustering effect from model (1) and (2). The estimate of the conservative dummy measure is -
0.0789 (t-statistic= -2.04), significant at 5%, and the estimate of the conservative index measure 
is -0.0596 (t-statistic=-1.80), significant at 10%. To address the economic significance of the effect 
of conservatism on M&A frequency, we compute the marginal effects. The marginal effect of the 
conservative dummy measure is -2% and the marginal effect of the continuous conservative 
measure is -1.4%.The finding support the notion of conservatism in that conservatives tend to 
prefer familiar rather than unfamiliar stimuli [Glasgow and Cartier (1985)] and also tend to exhibit 
the greater aversion to ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity [Wilson (1973b), Gillies and 
Campbell (1985); McAllister and Anderson (1991)].  
As a follow-up test, we use a simultaneous equation approach to investigate how conservative 
ideology is related to two different types of investments: external investment (M&A) and internal 
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investment (capital expenditure). We estimate a system of equations using seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR), in which the residuals are correlated.  
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                              (2) 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = ℎ(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) +  𝛾𝑖,𝑡                              (3)  
In the above, i indexes firms, t indexes years, Xi,t is the external investment decision (M&A), 
and Yi,t is the internal investment decision (Capital expenditure). From this specification, we 
analyze whether the conservative ideology has similar or differential effects on two investment 
decisions. Within the specification, the likelihood of external investment and that of capital 
expenditure are simultaneously estimated by regression on the set of control variables and the main 
variable – CEO conservatism. 
Models (3) and (4) in Table 2 estimate the system of two equations with the M&A dummy and 
the capital expenditure measure normalized by the total assets as the dependent variables. The 
regression results show that firms with conservative CEOs are less likely to engage in M&A but 
they are positively associated with capital expenditure, consistent with our hypothesis. Notably, 
our results are also consistent with the implications of Andrade and Stafford (2004). In their 
comparative study of mergers and internal corporate investment at the industry and firm levels, 
they find that both merger and internal investment are positively related to the firm’s Tobin’s q 
but differently related to industry landscape. In our models (3) and (4), the signs of Tobin’s q are 
positive on both dependent variables but the signs of industry competition variable are opposite.  
4.2. Method of Payments, Type of Targets, and Diversification 
Next we examine CEOs’ choice of method of payments, type of targets and diversification and 
examine the effect of their choices on announcement returns. The method of payment, the type of 
target, and diversification are the important determinants of acquirer returns. Studies that examine 
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the method of payment include Myers and Majluf (1984), Hansen (1987), Martin (1996), Fuller, 
et al. (2002), while those that focus on the type of target include Hansen and Lott (1996), Chang 
(1998), Mulherin and Boone (2000), and Fuller, et al. (2002). The topic of diversification are in 
Berger and Ofek (1995), Lang and Stulz (1994), and Rajan, et al. (2000). We use a probit 
regression specification to explore CEOs’ choices of these determinants.  
Pr{𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝐶𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡} = 𝐺(𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡𝐵)             (4) 
Y in Eq. (4) is a dummy variable where 1 signifies that the CEO uses stock as payment in 
models (1) and (2) of Table 3. Y in models (3) and (4) is a binary variable where 1 signifies that 
the type of target firm in M&A is private. In models (5) and (6), the dependent variable is a binary 
variable where 1 signifies that the first two digits of SIC code are identical for the acquirer and the 
target.    
Table 3 reports the regression results. In models (1) and (2), we find that firms are less likely 
to use stock as payment. The estimates in model (1) are -0.3381 (t-statistic=-4.42) and -0.2768 (t-
statistic=-4.13) after controlling for CEO characteristics and firm characteristics, respectively. 
Their marginal effects are -3.6% and -4.4%, respectively. This result can be explained by the nature 
of CEO ideology. Given the uncertainty in bidders’ stock offer as a method of payment [Gilson 
(1986), Fishman (1989)], selecting cash payment is consistent with greater uncertainty aversion 
exhibited by conservative CEOs.  Also reported in  Hutton, et al. (2013) and shown in Table 1, 
firms with conservative CEOs tend to have more cash holdings due to the better operating 
performance (higher ROA, profitability, and operating margin). When they have enough cash-
holding, bidders are less likely to face financing constraints.  
Next we test the relation between CEO conservatism and the type of target. Many studies 
identify the type of target as an important determinant to announcement returns. Fuller, et al. (2002) 
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argue that the differential market reactions to the acquisitions of private or subsidiary versus public 
targets are that bidders can acquire private or subsidiary firms at a lower price because these targets, 
unlike public firms, lack of liquidity. Indeed, there are significant differences in information 
availability on private or subsidiary targets relative to public targets. Unlike information on public 
targets that is more readily available, acquirers must collect private information and hence must 
incur higher information costs when buying a non-public target.  
In term of conservative ideology, the conservatives display greater aversion to uncertainty and 
a loss. Thus, conservative CEOs’ choice between private/subsidiary and public target is not clear 
because their choices depend on the size of liquidity effect (Price effect) and information effect. 
In models (3) and (4) of Table 3, we find that conservative CEOs’ are less likely to acquire private 
targets and more likely to acquire public targets. The estimate is -0.1959 (t-statistic=-3.07) in 
models (3), and -0.1749 (t-statistic=-3.19) in model (4). Their marginal effects are -4.0% and -
3.6%, respectively. 
We use diversification as a proxy for conservative CEOs’ tendency for status quo. First, due 
to their status quo tendency and less degree of informational asymmetry for the targets within the 
same industry, they are more inclined to conducting focus-increasing M&A. In addition, there is 
much evidence in the literature documenting a diversification discount [Berger and Ofek (1995); 
Lang and Stulz (1994); Rajan, et al. (2000)]. If the conservative ideology is associated with a loss 
aversion and a preference for similarity, then conservative CEOs are more likely to pursue deals 
that are focus-increasing. We find that conservative CEOs are indeed more likely to complete 
focus-increasing M&A, compared with non-conservative CEOs. In models (5) and (6) of Table 3, 
the estimate for the conservative CEO dummy is 0.0869 (t-statistic=1.79), significant at 5%, and 
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that for the conservative CEO index variable is 0.0917 (t-statistic=2.25), significant at 10%. Their 
marginal effects are -1.2% and -1.1%, respectively. 
4.3. Value Consequences 
We test whether CEO conservatism has a positive or negative impact on firm valuation in both 
the short term and the long term. For the short-term effect, we follow standard event study 
methodology to compute acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the three-day period 
(-1, 1) around the announcement date. We estimate the abnormal returns using a market adjusted 
model:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚 
where ri is the return on acquirer i and rm is the daily return on the CRSP value-weighted index.  
Table 4 reports the average abnormal announcement returns. The market response to M&A by 
conservative CEOs is not significantly different from that by non-conservative CEOs. This result 
suggests that CEO conservatism may not have a positive impact on firm valuation. Possible 
explanation is that as shown in the previous tests, there is a tendency for conservative CEOs to 
choose the determinants in a consistent way with their conservative ideology. For example, they 
are more(less) likely to use cash (stock) as a method of payment, are likely to acquire within-
industry targets, and are more likely to acquire public targets after controlling for other factors. 
However, each choice would affects the announcement abnormal returns differently (cash payment 
(+), focus-increasing (+), and public target (-)). Thus, the effect of CEO conservatism on short-
term firm valuation could be unclear. 
In the long-run performance analysis, however, we see that conservative CEOs outperform 
non-conservative CEOs over the five-year post M&A announcement. We use buy-and-hold 
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average abnormal returns over holding periods that extend from one to five years following M&A 
announcements. The buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for each event firm is calculated: 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(𝑖,𝑎,𝑏) = ∏(𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 1) − ∏(
𝑏
𝑡=𝑎
𝑏
𝑡=𝑎
𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 1)                             (5) 
 
where ER(i,a,b) = Excess return for event firm i over the time period from day a to day b; Rit 
is the return on the common stock of event firm i on day t; and Rmt is the return on the stock of the 
matched firm on day t. Matched firms are selected using the following sets of matching criteria: 
size and ratio of book to market value of equity. The post-announcement long-term abnormal 
returns do not include the abnormal returns over days -1 through 0 relative to the announcement 
date. If an event firm is delisted before the end of the buy-and-hold period, its truncated return 
series is still included in the analysis, and it is assumed to earn the daily return of the benchmark 
for the remainder of the period.  
Using matching method with size and book-to-market ratio as matching criteria (see Liu, 
Szewczyk and Zantout (2008)], we find that M&A conducted by conservative CEOs outperform 
those by non-conservative CEOs over 5 years. In Table 5, the abnormal buy and hold returns for 
M&A by conservative CEOs are 11.27% whereas BHARs for M&A by non-conservative CEOs 
are -9.46%. The difference between two BHARs is 20.73% (t-statistic=2.31). This result is 
interesting when compared with the results of other post-merger long-term studies reporting poor 
post-merger performance. Much of long term post-merger studies report that acquirer experience 
significantly negative abnormal returns over one to three(five) years after the merger [Agrawal, 
Jaffe and Mandelker (1992a) ; Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001)].  Especially, Agrawal, et al. 
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(1992a) reports that acquirers suffer a significant wealth loss of approximately 10 percent over the 
five years following the merger completion. The wealth loss over the five years for the mergers 
driven by non-conservative CEOs is -9.46 percent which is consistent with the finding of Agrawal, 
et al. (1992a). Meanwhile the abnormal buy and hold returns for M&A by conservative CEOs are 
11.27%. Thus, the result suggests that different managers’ different managing style may have an 
impact of the post-merger long term performance. 
The result from the time-series analysis is also confirmed with a cross-sectional analysis. Table 
6 reports the result of the cross-sectional regression of BHAR on conservative CEOs. We show 
that time-series result holds in the cross-sectional analysis. After controlling for CEO 
characteristics (age, tenure, and gender) and for deal characteristics (size, relative size, type of 
target, method of payment, deal attitude (Friendly vs. Hostile) and tender offer), we find that M&A 
by conservative CEOs outperform those by non-conservative CEOs. The coefficient for the 
conservative CEO dummy is 0.22 (t-statistic=1.93) and that for the conservative CEO index 
variable is 0.109 (t-statistic=1.73). Thus, while conservative CEOs may make suboptimal 
investment decisions for short-term by following their conservative preference, they do manage 
their firms in a way that ultimately enhance their firm value in the long run. 
4.4. Overconfidence 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) analyze the effect of CEO overconfidence on corporate M&A 
decisions. They find that the level of CEO overconfidence has an impact on merger frequency, 
merger financing, and deal quality, resulting in significantly negative announcement returns. Since 
the level of CEO overconfidence is another dimension of his or her personal beliefs and traits, we 
include an overconfidence variable and re-do the regression analyses. To construct the CEO 
overconfidence measure, we follow Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford and Stanley 
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(2011).1  Panel A in Table 7 shows a pairwise correlation between the conservative measure and 
the overconfidence measure. The correlation is negative but is less than 0.1, implying that 
conservatism and overconfidence are in opposite directions but are not strongly correlated. Panel 
B in Table 7 confirms that our previous results hold even after controlling for overconfidence and 
for the same set of controls used earlier. 
5. Conclusion 
We analyze the effect of CEO conservatism on M&A decisions. Given the evidence in the 
literature that CEOs’ behavioral consistency plays an important role in certain decisions of their 
firms, we examine specifically whether the same conservatism would also impact their firms’ 
M&A decisions and whether M&A by conservative CEOs have value implications. In our analysis, 
we use a CEO’s political contribution to determine the CEO’s level of conservatism.   
We find that conservative CEOs are significantly less likely to engage in M&A activities. This 
result holds whether we identify such CEOs with a dummy variable or an index variable. The result 
is also robust to controlling for standard M&A determinants (Q, size, free-cash-flow, leverage) as 
well as using firm and year fixed effects to remove the time and year effects. Our analysis also 
tests the likelihood that conservative CEOs would choose stock versus cash as method of payment. 
Consistent with the notion of being conservative, we find that conservative CEOs are indeed 
significantly less likely to use stock as payment method. We also find that conservative CEOs are 
more likely to prefer focus-increasing M&A as they are more likely to acquire the within-industry 
targets. This result is consistent with the argument that conservatives have the greater tendency for 
status quo and the greater concern for better performance.  
                                                          
1 See Campbell, et al. (2011) to see how to construct CEO overconfidence measureCampbell, et al. (2011) 
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To address the question of whether conservative CEOs add value to their firms in their M&A, 
we analyze the market’s reaction to M&A announcements. In a multivariate regression test, we 
find no statistically significant difference in market response to the announcement between 
conservative and non-conservative CEOs. However, the long-term performance analysis shows 
that conservative CEOs do add value to their firms. Over the five years of post-mergers 
announcement, conservative CEOs outperform non-conservative CEOs by 20.73% (significant at 
5%). Our finding is consistent with that in Hutton, et al. (2013) who show that firms run by 
conservative CEOs tend to have better operating performance.  
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ESSAY 2. 
Local Political Ideology and Acquirers’ Announcement Returns 
 
1. Introduction  
Recently, much literature has reported that political ideology has a significant impact on firms’ 
investment decisions and valuation. For example, Hutton, Jiang and Kumar (2013), studying 
whether the political ideology of top executives influences corporate policies and firm behavior, 
find that their political ideology is an important factor for their firms’ corporate policies and 
influencing the firms’ valuation. Supporting the argument that capital markets incorporate political 
value into stock prices, Kim, Pantzalis and Park (2011) find evidence that there is a relation 
between political geography and the cross section of stock returns. Similarly, Hong and 
Kostovetsky (2011) find that political affiliations of mutual fund managers in the United States 
appear to influence their investment decisions. In particular, managers who donate to Democrats 
tend to prefer stocks of companies that are deemed socially responsible. With respect to individual 
investors, Bonaparte, Kumar and Page (2010) provide evidence that local political climate and 
individual investors’ political affiliations influence their perceptions of risk and reward and thus 
their portfolio decisions.   
In light of the empirical evidence suggesting a systematic difference between corporate 
executives, money managers, and individuals of Republican and of Democratic political 
affiliations, an interesting extension is to ask if the partisan difference has an impact on firms’ 
merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We focus on the M&A decisions because they are one 
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of the most important events for the acquirer and for the target. Further, since stock market 
reactions to announcements of M&A are well known in the literature, our examination of whether 
political ideology similarities or differences affect acquirer and target returns may help to shed 
new light on M&A decisions.  
Much of the explanation for the success or failure of M&A has focused on financial factors. 
However, academics and practitioners also concede that corporate culture should play a crucial 
role in determining the success or failure of an M&A. Since a key factor for successful mergers 
and acquisitions is whether there is “fit” between the acquirer and the target that would facilitate 
integration and generate synergies, it makes sense to suggest that a “fit” in corporate culture would 
affect the performance of an M&A (Datta and Puia (1995)). Recent anecdotal evidence of the 
importance of cultural fit is Google's acquisition of Motorola Mobility announced on Aug 15, 2011. 
One of the main concerns was about the cultural mix of the two firms: a culture of freewheeling 
innovation in Google versus a staid culture of bureaucracy in Motorola Mobility2. It is not hard to 
imagine that such cultural differences could impede integration into the acquirer and management 
of the target when the two firms merge. The misalignment of culture is often considered to be a 
major cause for many corporate mergers and acquisitions to fail.  
Clearly, an important element of corporate culture is the firm’s or its employees’ assimilation, 
which we measure with local political ideology. The evidence in Kim, et al. (2011) indicates that 
investors consider corporate political ideology to be an important risk factor in valuing a firm. 
Given the relevance of political ideology, it seems that a political ideology conflict between the 
acquirer and the target would pose a risk to the successful integration of the two, and therefore 
would affect the stock market reaction to the announcement of an M&A.  
                                                          
2 See the WSJ article: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904253204576512761738987674.html 
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In this paper, we posit that a greater degree of political ideology distance between the acquirer 
and the target would lead to a higher risk or higher cost associated with the integration process and 
hence a less favorable market response to the M&A announcements. As mentioned, underlying 
this argument is the notion that cultural differences represent a source of acquisition risk and a 
potential obstacle to achieving integration benefits. Our contention is also consistent with the 
cultural distance hypothesis which, in its most general form, suggests that the difficulties, costs, 
and risks associated with cross cultural contact increase with growing cultural differences between 
two individuals, groups, or organizations [see, e.g., Hofstede (1980)]. Thus, in this study, we 
hypothesize that homogeneous (close) political ideology between acquirers and targets would 
result in greater positive abnormal returns upon the announcements of the mergers than would 
heterogeneous (distant) political ideology between the two and we test this hypothesis.  
We examine M&As between 1981 and 2009 because the results of presidential elections are 
available from the U.S. Census from 1980 to 2008. Following the literature [see, e.g., Hilary and 
Hui (2009); Bonaparte, et al. (2010); and Kumar (2009)], we adopt a location-based identification 
approach that infers corporate political ideology by the results of presidential elections at the 
county level. As Bonaparte, et al. (2010) point out, we cannot identify precisely the political 
affiliation of each acquirer and target. Nonetheless, our measure is very beneficial to our study. As 
shown in Table 1, public targets account for just 27 percent of our sample. Almost all firm- or 
manager level data are available only for public firms. Thus, if we adapt firm level or top manager 
level measures to identify firms’ political affiliation, then it will drop private/subsidiary targets, 
which take 73 percent of our sample and could generate biased results.  
Although the location-based identification strategy is not as precise as is firm or manager level 
identification strategy, still it allows us to examine the political ideology effect using larger sample, 
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thereby more robust results. Adopting the location-based identification strategy, we identify 
whether an acquirer (target) is located in Republican or Democratic dominated region, based on 
the region’s voting pattern in recent elections. We then categorize the acquirer (target) as the 
Republican or Democratic based upon its local voter turnout. The assumption we make here is that 
firms located in regions that are dominated by Republican or Democratic voters are more likely to 
subscribe to the Republican or Democratic political ideology, respectively.  
We begin with 17,126 U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1981 and 2009 to investigate the 
effect of difference in local political ideologies on the likelihood of deal completion.  Many studies 
report that abandonment of a merger deal incurs heavy penalties, which can be as high as over 6% 
of transaction value. In addition, cancelling an announced deal can severely impair the firm’s 
reputation and credibility [Luo (2005)]. Thus, we test the impact of political ideology closeness 
between acquirers and targets on deal completion after controlling for other factors. We find that 
when counties of acquirers and targets subscribe to the same ideologies, deals are more likely to 
be completed (coefficient= 0.2597, and t-statistics=1.98 significant at 5%). This result is confirmed 
with the political ideology distance variable, which is the absolute value of difference in local 
ideology between acquirer and target. The estimate of the variable is -0.2682(t-statistics=-1.95 
significant at 10%). The findings support our conjecture that cultural similarity, measured by local 
political ideology between acquirers and targets, plays a positive role in completing mergers. 
To test whether a differing ideology induces different market reaction to the merger 
announcements, we focus on a completed merger sample consisting of 12,075 mergers. Using this 
sample, we find that acquirers that are politically proximate to their targets earn significantly 
higher positive abnormal returns than politically distant acquirers on announcement windows. In 
Panel B of Table 4 with full sample, the average five-day CAR over the (-2, +2) window is 1.67 
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percent for politically homogeneous deals, but only 1.11 percent for politically heterogeneous 
deals. The extra 57 basis points in returns to acquirers of homogeneous deals over heterogeneous 
ones is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-statistics=2.40).  
However, in each presidential election, there are some battlegrounds which are often referred 
to as a “purple” – a mixture of red for being solidly Republican and blue for Democratic. Because 
of the nature of “purple” counties– neither reliably Republican nor Democratic – their voter results 
could produce an identification noise and thereby reduce the reliability of the effect of a differing 
political ideology on announcement returns. To control for the purple county effect, we use several 
higher cutoff points for the margin of victory in a county. In Glaeser and Ward (2005), the 
definition of battle ground states, it is where a party’s margin of victory is less than 10 percent.  
When we use 10 percent, 15 percent, and 20 percent of victory margin to remove noise from 
possible misspecification in Panel B of Table 4, the differences in the abnormal returns of 
politically similar takeovers versus dissimilar ones increase to 0.87 percent (t-statistics=3.22 
significant at 1%), 1.08 percent (t-statistics=3.13 significant at 1%), and 2.88 percent (t-
statistics=4.32 significant at 1%), respectively. Particularly, when 20 percent of margin of victory 
is used as a cutoff point, the abnormal announcement returns on mergers driven by politically 
different acquirers and targets are even negative (coefficient=-0.19). That is, the closer the political 
proximity between an acquirer and its target, the more positive the market valuation of the merger. 
Our evidence suggests that homogeneous political ideology between acquirers and targets is an 
important determinant of acquirer returns.  
The result of our univariate tests still holds after we control for deal characteristics, acquirer 
characteristics and local demographic characteristics. After controlling for all known determinants 
of bidder returns, we find that homogeneous deals still generate higher returns than heterogeneous 
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deals. In the model (1) of Table 5, the coefficient on homogeneous dummy variable is 0.0057(t-
statistics=2.99 significant at 1%), meaning that when acquirers and targets have same ideology, 
the announcement returns is 57 basis points higher than deals in which acquirers and targets 
subscribe to different ideology. In the model (2) of Table 5, the coefficient on Homogeneous 
acquisition is -0.0099 ((t-statistics=-2.03 significant at 5%) consistent with the finding above. Also 
we observe the incremental effect in the univariate test as the cut off points increase from 10 to 20 
percent.  
Recently, Uysal, Kedia and Panchapagesan (2008) argue that geographic distance between 
acquirer and target is a potential determinant of announcement returns due to the information effect 
and industry clustering effect. They find that local M&A earns higher returns than non-local M&A 
because of information advantage arising from geographical proximity. Thus, we test whether our 
measure still has explanatory power after controlling for the geographic factor. We add geographic 
proximity and state dummy as control variables to our regression. After controlling all these 
variables, we still find that our results remain unchanged. Finally, we re-define local political 
ideology with presidential election outcomes and mid-term election outcomes to check whether 
our results still hold with the new measure. All the coefficients of our measures in Table 7 confirm 
our previous results.The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the 
related literature and discuss our approach. Section 3 describes the data, while section 4 reports 
the results and our interpretation. We conclude in Section 5. 
2. Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1. Culture and Cross Border M&A performance 
The role of cultural difference between the acquirer and the target in mergers and acquisitions 
has received considerable attention in the international business literature, especially in the cross- 
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border M&A literature. This literature has sought to explain M&A performance or 
underperformance in terms of the impact that factors such as cultural distance [Morosini, Shane 
and Singh (1998)] and cultural fit [Weber, Shenkar and Raveh (1996)] have on the integration 
process and on the financial performance of firms engaging in M&A activities. A key assumption 
underlying much of this research is the notion that cultural differences represent a source of 
acquisition risk. This is consistent with the cultural distance hypothesis [Hofstede (1980)] on 
which most of this research has based, suggesting that greater cultural differences should lead to 
more costs and higher risk in cross-cultural interactions.  
The empirical results, however, have been inconclusive or even inconsistent [Cartwright and 
Schoenberg (2006), Stahl and Voigt (2008)]. For example, Datta and Puia (1995) find that 
acquisitions characterized by greater cultural distance resulted in lower wealth effect for acquiring 
firms’ shareholders and better cultural fit had an important impact  
 Morosini, et al. (1998), on the other hand, provide evidence that indicates a positive 
relation between the cultural distance and the performance of acquirers and also argue that the 
cultural difference may not be related to the performance of acquirers in M&A due to the nature 
of complexity of culture. Also, Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee and Jayaraman (2008) find that 
contrary to the general perception, cross-border acquisitions perform better in the long run if the 
acquirer and the target come from countries that are more disparate. Overall, it is fair to say that 
although the cultural distance hypothesis seems to be intuitively plausible and appears to be 
supported by some anecdotal evidence, a growing body of empirical research on the impact of 
cultural differences on M&A has yielded generally inconclusive and often contradictory results.  
2.2. Local Political Climate and Corporate Political Ideology 
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Given our use of the location-based identification approach that infers corporate political 
ideology by the presidential election results at the county level, it is important for us to establish 
the validity of connecting corporate political ideology with the local political climate. A number 
of studies have touched on this connection and the related issues. 
The number of firms that relocate is generally small. The initial corporate decision on where 
to locate its headquarter tends to be based on the need to attract and retain workers who have the 
right combination of skills for the company’s lines of business. Firms also strive to be near their 
customers and suppliers. As a result, firms move their headquarters infrequently. When such a 
move does occur, the impetus is often a desire to be closer to the company’s stakeholders. In fact, 
Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find only 118 examples of relocations in a sample of more than 5,000 
firms over 15 years.  
There is evidence that the geographical distance between a firm’s investors and its headquarter 
is an important factor in the investors’ trading and portfolio decisions. Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), and Feng and Seasholes (2004) find that investors 
exhibited home bias and were more likely to hold local firms’ securities in their portfolios. This 
home bias suggests that one can proxy for the shareholder political view by the election result of 
voters in the location of the firm’s headquarter.  
Corporate executive and other interested stakeholders tend to reside near the firm’s headquarter. 
The literature provides a theoretical basis for their tendency to cluster around customers and a 
large pool of potential employees. Glasmeier (1988)  and Porter (2000) show that proximity to 
consumers is particularly beneficial to firms that depend on a rapid differentiation of products to 
meet consumer demands by enabling them to beat the competition with new products and a faster 
response in the marketplace. Firms also benefit by being close to a well-educated labor market that 
 
 
33 
 
understands new technology. All this suggests that the location of corporate headquarters 
correlates with a concentration of stakeholders. Because of this clustering of the important 
stakeholders of the firm around its headquarter, we think it is reasonable that election results of 
the locality would reflect the political views of stakeholders Logically, it is also reasonable that 
corporate decision-makers would align the firm’s value and vision with the view of their 
stakeholders, so as to reduce conflicts and benefit the. Thus, we believe that companies would 
exhibit a certain degree of sensitivity to the political preferences of their communities.  
Even if most stakeholders do not reside near their firms’ headquarters or election results do not 
prove to be a good proxy for the stakeholders’ political views, it is possible that the community 
where corporate executives reside would still exert some influence on their political values. If we 
believe that social interactions tend to occur much more frequently between corporate executives 
and the people living in the community in which the company is headquartered, then it is plausible 
that the election preferences of the community would influence the firm’s political views.  
The above view is consistent with the contention Akerlof and Kranton (2000) that social 
identity affects people’s behavior and that individuals tend to conform to their respective social 
groups. It is also consistent with Murphy and Shleifer (2004), who argue that identity and social 
networks tend to feed on each other. Since executives tend to reside near their firm’s headquarter, 
the political views of their community would make a relatively good proxy for their political 
beliefs. Hutton, Jiang and Kumar (2011) also provides evidence that there are strong similarities 
between the corporate and local political environment and manager's political value. They show 
that a manager with a certain political orientation is more likely to be associated with a firm that 
has a similar political ideology and/or is located in a region with a similar political environment. 
In this regard, corporate policies are likely to reflect the political values of managers, employees, 
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and other shareholders, and thus, would be closely related to the local political environment. Our 
conjecture is also supported in part by the findings that many firms have local clienteles [e.g., 
Coval and Moskowitz (2001); and IvkoviĆ and Weisbenner (2005)] Likewise, Hilary and Hui 
(2009) argue that the culture of an organization is generally aligned with the local environment of 
the firm. Managerial style, corporate culture, employees' preferences, and investment behavior 
should fit together. They also argue that to the extent that individuals residing in a county are 
socially homogeneous (e.g., religiosity), then firms located in the county would reflect the 
individuals' preferences in their corporate culture and decision making. 
2.3. Hypotheses 
Confusion and distrust in merger transaction can be driven by organizational cultural 
differences between acquirer and target firms (e.g., management style and other employees’ work-
related values), resulting in post-merger conflict. To examine whether cultural difference has a 
negative impact on merger outcomes, we link local political ideology as a proxy for corporate 
culture to potential costs in mergers: deal completion and announcement returns. 
Deal completion is important to acquirers because they incur substantial up-front costs in 
making the initial offer. In addition, the acquirers bears costs associated with revealing valuable 
private information about the post-acquisition plans for the target’s assets [Officer (2003)]. 
Furthermore, once the appropriate target is identified, preparation of the offer typically requires 
the services of outside accounting, financial and legal advisers. Luo (2005) also argues cancelling 
an announced deal can severely impair the firm’s reputation and credibility. 
Dikova, Sahib and van Witteloostuijn (2009) argue that cultural differences could be potential 
deal breaker. They argue that cultural differences are likely to increase the probability of disputes 
which may cause a deal abandonment.   
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Hypothesis 1: When political distance between acquirer and target is closer, the likelihood 
of deal completion is high. 
One of popular measures to gauge merger success is announcement abnormal returns. In other 
words, the lack of turns to the acquirers reflects a merger failure. M&A literature has reported 
factors affecting the returns: method of payment, type of target, relative size and others [Fuller, 
Netter and Stegemoller (2002) ; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004); Masulis, Wang and Xie 
(2007a); and others]. In addition to these factors, we posit that cultural difference is one of 
determinants of announcement abnormal returns. 
Hypothesis 2: When political distance between acquirer and target is closer, the 
announcement abnormal returns are high. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To estimate the gains of acquirers’ shareholders from acquisitions, we examine the 
announcement returns of that mergers and acquisitions that are successfully completed. In a 
subsequent section, we will use a larger merger and acquisition sample which includes incomplete 
deals, private acquirers, and all types of targets (public, private, and subsidiary) to test whether the 
similarity in political ideology of acquirers and targets can predict the probability of deal success. 
3.1. M&A and Election Data  
We obtain our sample from Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and 
Acquisitions database. The sample initially consists of all merger and acquisition transactions to 
test the effect of political ideology on the deal completion and then limit to completed merger and 
acquisition transactions to test the market reaction to the deal announcement between January 1, 
1981 and December 31, 2009. To be included in our final sample, the following requirements must 
be met: 
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1. The acquirer is a public firm having at least five days, around the announcement of the 
takeover, of returns listed in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and also 
having accounting information in COMPUSTAT. The target can, however, be a public or 
a private firm. 
2. The acquirer and the target are both U.S. firms. 
3. Neither the acquirer nor the target is a financial or utility firm (SIC between 4900 and 4999, 
and SIC 6000 and 6999). 
4. The acquirer and the target’s headquarter zip code information is available at the time of 
the takeover announcement. 
5. At least one million dollars of deal value which is defined by SDC as the total value paid 
by the acquirer to the target, excluding fees and expenses. 
6. The bidder acquires more than 50 percent of the target. 
In our sample, we also require that the relative size of a deal be greater than 1%. The relative 
size is the ratio of the deal value to the market value of the acquirer. The market value is defined 
as the number of shares outstanding  times the share price in CRSP five days prior to the 
announcement [Netter, Stegemoller and Wintoki (2011)].  
We group the method of payment into three categories. (1) pure cash financing (2) pure stock 
financing and (3) Mix financing comprises combinations of common stock, cash, debt, preferred 
stock, and convertible securities [see, Martin (1996); Netter, et al. (2011)].  Table 1 reports the 
distribution of the sample of mergers and acquisitions by announcement years.  The number of 
mergers and acquisitions reaches its highest level in the late 1990s.  Moeller, et al. (2004) report a 
similar pattern in the number of mergers and acquisitions by announcement years.  Table 1 also 
reports proportions of homogenous mergers, in-state mergers and local mergers. 61 percent of 
 
 
37 
 
deals are classified as a homogenous deal while in-state and local deals are 22 percent and 15 
percent of the entire sample, respectively.  
3.2. Corporate Political Ideology Variable  
Based on the zip codes of headquarters of targets and acquirers, we infer their political 
identities using the county level voting results from the presidential elections between 1980 and 
2008. Given the headquarter location of target and of acquirer, we use the voting pattern to label 
the corresponding county either “Republican” or “Democratic”. For instance, in a particular 
presidential election, a county is identified as Republican (Democratic) if the Republican 
(Democratic) candidate wins in the county. To capture the degree of Republican (Democratic) 
strength in a county, we compute the difference (the margin of victory) between the percentages 
of votes for the Republican and that for the Democratic. 
 Once we identify the political affiliation of the county from each presidential election, we 
assign the political value to the firm located in that county. This location-based identification 
strategy is used in Kumar (2009), Hilary and Hui (2009) and in Bonaparte, et al. (2010) to infer 
the education level, religiosity, and race/ethnicity of investors and managers. As they point out, 
using the location-based identification approach to assign accurate political affiliation value to 
target and acquirer has limitations. However, as long as firms in the locations concentrated by one 
political party are more likely to subscribe to the party’s political ideology, we could assign the 
political affiliation value to targets and acquirers. In other words, firms located in counties that 
have voted strongly for the Republican (Democratic) party are more likely to have similar political 
views. The assumption underlying the political values assignment process is that local political 
climate would be stable during one presidential election cycle. The outcome of presidential 
elections should also be a better measure for local political climate than the result midterm 
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elections. This is because presidential elections typically see much higher voter turnouts than do 
midterm elections. For example, according to the data provided by Professor McDonald 
(http://elections.gmu.edu), the state-level VEP (voting eligible population) turnout rate in the 2006 
midterm election in which the vote for the highest office is Governor, U.S. Senator, or House of 
Representatives ranged from 32 percent to 55 percent. In contrast, in the subsequent 2008 
presidential election, the state-level VEP turnout rate was much higher, ranging from 51 percent 
to 71 percent. Because voter turnouts in presidential elections are generally much higher than those 
in midterm elections, the local political climate would clearly be better reflected in the presidential 
election with the higher turnout. 
3.3. Bidder Characteristics 
We control for the bidder characteristics such as firm size, free cash flow, leverage, ROA and 
Tobin's q. The bidder characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Moeller, et al. (2004) find evidence that bidder size is negatively correlated with 
the acquirer's announcement abnormal returns. They interpret this size effect as evidence 
supporting the hubris hypothesis [Roll (1986)], since they find that on average larger acquirers pay 
higher premiums and make acquisitions that generate negative dollar synergies. Thus, we expect 
negative relation between firm size and announcement bidder returns. Lang, Stulz and Walkling 
(1991) and Servaes (1991) document a positive relation for tender offer acquisitions whereas 
Moeller, et al. (2004) find a negative relation in a comprehensive sample of acquisitions. Thus, we 
expect either positive or negative relation between free cash flow and announcement bidder returns.  
We also control for the acquirer's free cash flow. Jensen (1986) argues that the more free cash 
flow managers have, the more likely they engage in value-destroying M&A. However, high free 
cash flows can reflect better firm performance. Thus, we expect either positive or negative relation 
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between free cash flow and announcement bidder returns. Leverage is an important governance 
mechanism, since higher debt levels help reduce future free cash flows and limit managerial 
discretion. Leverage also provides incentives for managers to improve firm performance, since 
managers have to cede significant control to creditors and often lose their jobs if their firms fall 
into financial distress. We expect leverage to have a positive effect on CAR.  
3.4. Deal Characteristics 
We also control for the deal characteristics: types of target, method of payment, relative deal 
size, industry relatedness of the acquisition, tender offer and whether the bidder and the target are 
both from high tech industries. Fuller, et al. (2002) and Moeller, et al. (2004) find that acquirers 
have significantly negative abnormal returns when acquiring public targets and significantly 
positive abnormal returns when targets are private firms or subsidiaries. They argue that acquirers 
take advantage of liquidity discount of private or subsidiary targets by acquiring them. To take this 
evidence into account, we use three indicator variables denoted by public, private, and subsidiary 
to represent types of target.  
The method of payment is also related to the stock market’s response to acquisition 
announcements. It has been known that the acquirers' announcement return is significantly 
negative when they pay for their acquisitions with equity. This is generally attributed to the adverse 
selection problem in equity issuance analyzed by Myers and Majluf (1984). However, Fuller, et 
al. (2002) report that the stock price impact of stock-financed deals is less negative or even positive 
when the target is private. Netter, et al. (2011) also show that the result that negative acquirer 
returns are associated with deals where equity is a method of payment is sample specific.  
We create three indicator variables denoted by stock, cash and mix, where stock equals one for 
acquisitions financed only with stocks and zero otherwise, cash equals one for acquisitions 
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financed only with cash and zero otherwise, and mix equals one for transaction financed with a 
combination of cash and stock. Also we control for other variables such as  focus acquisition 
[Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990); Amihud and Lev (1981); Shleifer and Vishny (1989); Campa 
and Kedia (2002); Villalonga (2004)], relative deal size [Moeller, et al. (2004)], high technology 
industry [Loughran and Ritter (2004)], and tender offer [Travlos (1987)] .  
3.5. Geographic Variable 
 In addition to bidder and deal characteristics, we take the geographical location of acquirer 
and target into consideration. Uysal, et al. (2008) show that when M&A deals are local transactions, 
bidder returns are higher than non-local transactions. They argue that the higher return to local 
bidder is related to information advantage arising from geographic proximity. Since geographic 
proximity is correlated with political ideology variable, we control for the geographic proximity. 
We use three geographic variables (in-state which is a dummy variable where in-state equals one 
if acquirer and target are located in the same state and zero otherwise, local dummy which takes 1 
when acquirer and target are located within 100kilimiter, local variable which measures the 
geographic distance). To compute the geographic distance, we match the zip codes of targets and 
acquirers reported in SDC with zip code from US Census Bureau Gazetteer to get latitudes and 
longitudes for each acquirer and target. Then we estimate distance between target and acquirer 
using the Haversine formula. The distance between target and acquirer is  
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, latitudeacquirer -latitudetarget dlat           
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Following Uysal, et al. (2008), Malloy (2005), and Coval and Moskowitz (2001), if the 
distance between target and acquirer is less than one hundred kilometers we group the transactions 
as local deals. The variable local is a dummy variable where local equals one if distance between 
target and acquirer is less than one hundred kilometers and zero otherwise.  As they argue that 
local deals take advantage of information, we expect that local deals generate higher return that 
non local deals. Shown in Table 1, 22 percent of the deals are classified as in-state M&A if target 
and acquirer are located in same state. On the same side, 18 percent of the sample is classified as 
local based upon the computed geographic proximity. This pattern is very consistent with that of 
Uysal, et al. (2008).   
3.6. Demographic Variables 
Demographic information of each county such as county population, education level, income, 
ethnicity, race, and gender is obtained from the Census Bureau. Since county level crime rate and 
income are highly correlated with other demographic variables we exclude them from our 
regression. We also include a religious activity variable as an important control variable for local 
culture. Hilary and Hui (2009) investigate how the level of religiosity in a firm's environment has 
an impact on its corporate behavior. They find that there is a positive relation between individual 
religiosity and risk aversion, influencing organizational behavior.  
The local religiosity data is obtained from churches and church membership file provided from 
ARDA (American Religion Data Archive).  However, information on religiosity at the county 
level is only available for four years (1971, 1980, 1990 and 2000). To obtain the values in the 
missing years (from 1981 to1989, from 1991 to 1999, from 2001 to 2009) we use linear 
interpolation and extrapolation [refer to  Hilary and Hui (2009)]. After collecting the county level 
demographic information, we compute the difference in each demographic variable between 
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acquirer and target. The differences of demographic variables could measure general cultural 
difference between acquirer and target.  
3.7. Summary Statistics 
As shown in Panel A of Table 2 acquirers in homogenous deals acquire more public targets 
but few targets that are private firms or subsidiaries. This finding is quite interesting due to the 
evidence on the effect of types of target on announcement returns by Fuller, et al. (2002) and 
Moeller, et al. (2004).  They find that acquirers, which are public firms, have significantly negative 
abnormal returns when acquiring other public firms and significantly positive abnormal returns 
when targets are private firms or subsidiaries. Thus, if the abnormal returns are determined by the 
types of target, it is reasonable to expect that heterogeneous deals would have higher abnormal 
returns than homogeneous abnormal returns. In addition, homogeneous deals are more likely to be 
financed with stock and less financed with cash. Although the negative effect of equity payment 
is not robust to all sample [Netter, et al. (2011)], much literature reports the negative effect of 
equity payment on returns. Therefore, heterogeneous deals could have higher CARs than that of 
homogeneous deals if there is strong negative effect of equity payment. Also homogeneous deals 
acquire smaller targets than do heterogeneous deals in terms of deal value.  
Panel B of Table 2 shows that the acquirers in homogeneous deals, on average, have higher Q, 
lower free cash flow, lower leverage, lower ROA and higher cash holding. However, the average 
size (measured by total asset, and market value of equity) of the acquirers in homogeneous deals 
is not significantly different from that of the acquirers in heterogeneous deals. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Likelihood of Deal Completion 
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We investigate the impact of local political ideology on the probability of deal completion. 
Table 3 reports the results of logistic analyses focusing on the effect of cultural difference on 
merger completion. We focus on two ideology variables: ideology dummy and ideology distance 
variables. As control variables, we include cumulative abnormal returns over -1 and 1 window, 
focus increasing dummy, deal attitude (Friendly), legal ligation dummy, repeated bidder dummy, 
high tech industry dummy, types of target dummies, firm characteristics dummies, and local 
demographic variables. Model (1) and (2) in Table 3 reveals that cultural difference plays a role in 
determining the likelihood of deal completion. Model (1) in Table 3 shows that the probability of 
completing deal is higher when acquire and target are located in counties whose ideologies are 
identical. Model (2) also confirms the result from model (1). The negative coefficient of political 
distance variable in model (2) indicates that as political ideology distance increase, the likelihood 
of deal completion decreases after controlling for other potential factors for deal completion. It is 
noticeable that there is no effect of geographic distance between parties in mergers. Thus, the 
results of Table 3 suggest that the identical or close political ideologies of acquire and target are 
more likely to lead successful merger. 
4.2. Acquirer Announcement Return 
We measure bidder announcement effect by the market model with value-weighted market 
index return around initial acquisition announcement.3 The announcement dates are obtained from 
SDC’s U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database. We estimate 3-day cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) during the window over event days (-1, +1), where event day 0 is the acquisition 
announcement date.  
                                                          
3 Different benchmark model (e.g., market model), different index (equally weighted index), and different windows 
(e.g.,(-3,+3) and (-1,+1) are also used but results are not quantitatively different. 
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As Panel A of Table 4 shows, the average 3-day CAR for the full sample is 1.45 percent, which 
is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. This is very similar to the findings from 
other studies (e.g., 1.77 percent CAR over (-2, +2) with value-weighted market index in Fuller, et 
al. (2002), 1.10 percent CAR over (-1,+1) with value-weighted market index in Moeller, et al. 
(2004)). The mean CAR of deals with cash payment is 1.64 percent, significantly different from 
zero at the 1 percent level, the mean CAR of deals with mix payment is 1.71 percent, significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level, and the mean CAR of deals with stock payment is 0.65 
percent, significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. This latter result might be 
reflection of the recent findings of Fuller, et al. (2002) and Netter, et al. (2011). Acquisitions of 
subsidiary target are associated with higher acquirer returns, with an average bidder CAR of 2.76 
percent, followed by acquisitions of private target with an average bidder CAR of 2.18 percent. 
Acquisitions of public target generate the lowest bidder CAR of -0.96 percent. All three mean 
CARs are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, which is consistent with those in Fuller, et 
al. (2002).   
4.3. Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous Mergers and Acquisitions 
In Panel B of Table 4, we analyze the announcement abnormal returns to acquirers acquiring 
targets sharing similar political values (Homogeneous acquisition). The average CAR to acquirers 
in homogeneous deals is 1.67 percent, which is higher than the average CAR of 1.11 percent to 
acquirer in heterogeneous deals. Compared to the 3-day CAR of 1.45 percent for the full sample 
reported in Panel A, the average CAR to acquirers in homogeneous deals is higher. The mean 
difference of abnormal returns between homogenous and heterogeneous transactions for the full 
sample is 0.57 percent, which is significant at the 5 percent level.  If acquisitions are paid for with 
a mix of cash and stocks, the homogeneous deals generate a significant positive abnormal return 
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of 0.81 percent, but if deals are paid for with either cash or mix, there is no significant difference 
in CARs between homogeneous and heterogeneous deals even if the differences are positive.  
For further analysis, we impose a restriction to eliminate the potential misidentification caused 
by the battleground counties. Some counties changed their political preference either temporally. 
To mitigate this issue, we use different cut-off points of margin of victory.  The advantage of suing 
different cut-off points is to allow us to test whether the strength of local political affiliation has 
an impact on the announcement returns. We hypothesize that stronger homogeneous M&A deals 
generate much higher abnormal announcement returns than heterogeneous M&A deals since risk 
caused by potential conflict is more likely to be significantly reduced.  
As hypothesized, as we increase the level of margin of victory from 10 percent to 20 percent, 
the statistical significance and economic importance of the difference between CARs of 
homogeneous and heterogeneous M&A increase. In the full sample reported in Panel B, we find 
that acquirers of homogeneous deals earn higher return than heterogeneous deals only when buying 
private targets. The average CAR of acquirers of homogeneous deals is 1.67 percent whereas the 
average CAR of acquirers of heterogeneous deals is 1.11 percent. The difference of the average 
CARs between homogeneous and heterogeneous deals is 57 basis points, which is significant at 
the 5 percent level. We find that the magnitude of the difference between the CARs become larger 
as the margin of victory restriction increases from 5 percent to 20 percent. Under the 10 percent, 
15 percent, and 20 percent margin of victory requirement the differences are 87 basis points, 108 
basis points and 288 basis points at the 1 percent significance level.  
When the bids are partitioned by method of payment (cash, stock, or mix of cash and stock), 
we find that  homogeneous deals have, on average, higher returns than heterogeneous deals but 
only bidder returns for mix are statistically significant. However, homogeneous deals under the 20 
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percent margin of victory restriction generate higher announcement returns than heterogeneous 
deals regardless of types of target and methods of payment except for equity payment. Thus, we 
take this result as evidence showing that as similarity of political ideology between acquirer and 
target increases the market responds more positively to the announcement due to a lower perceived 
risk/cost associated with conflict of corporate culture. 
4.4. Regression Results 
Thus far, we have provided results from univariate test that support the hypothesis that more 
homogenous acquisitions result in larger abnormal announcement day returns. To ensure the 
robustness of this result we carry out the following test. We examine the result from the univariate 
test, controlling for bidder and deal characteristics, demographic variables and geographic 
variables. In Table 5, we confirm the results in the univariate tests. All the signs on our political 
ideology variables are consistent with our conjecture that homogeneous deals earn higher returns 
than heterogeneous deals after controlling for bidder and deal characteristics, and demographic 
variables. In model (1) and (2), the coefficients are 0.0057 with a t-statistic of 2.99 and -0.0099 
with a t-statistic of 2.47, indicating that on average acquirers of homogenous deal earn 66 (59) 
basis points more than heterogeneous deals after controlling for other determinants.  
We further investigate whether strength of local political values have an impact on 
announcement returns. We observe the same pattern shown in the univariate test. As we increase 
the level of margin of victory requirement from 10% to 20%, economic importance of cultural 
difference on CARs increases. Under the 10 percent margin of victory restriction, the coefficient 
in model (3) is 0.0091 with a t-statistic of 3.01. Under the 15 percent margin of victory restriction, 
the coefficient of homogenous deal in model (5) is 0.013 with a t-statistic of 3.33. Under the 20 
percent margin of victory restriction, the coefficient of homogenous deal in model (7) is 0.019 
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with a t-statistic of 2.65. From model (4), (6), and (8), we find that as cut-off restriction increases, 
the negative effect of political ideology distance on announcement returns becomes larger. With 
this finding, we confirm that political cultural difference plays a critical role in determining 
announcement abnormal returns. 
Most of the coefficient estimates for the bidder and deal characteristics variables and 
demographic variables are consistent with the findings of existing literature. Across the model 
specifications, acquirers' size measured by log of total asset are negatively related to announcement 
returns, which is consistent with the finding of Moeller, et al. (2004). Free cash flow is negatively 
related to CAR but not statistically significant. ROA has a negative effect on bidder returns except 
for model (1). Leverage has a positive impact on bidder returnsMasulis, Wang and Xie (2007b). 
Tobin's q has a negative effect on bidder returns except for the first specification.  
4.5. Robustness 
4.5.1. Geographic Factor 
In Table 6, we control for geographic proximity variables; in-state which is a dummy 
variable defined as one if acquirer and target are located in same state and zero otherwise, 
local(dummy) which is a dummy variable defined as one if acquirer and target are located within 
100 kilometer and zero otherwise and continuous local variable, which measure the geographic 
proximity and. Uysal, et al. (2008) show that when M&A deals are local transactions, bidder 
returns are higher than non-local transactions. If our result is driven by geographic proximity, then 
our main variable would be insignificantly different zero.  
In model (1) and (2) in Table 6, the coefficients of homogeneous dummy and homogeneous 
continuous variable are 0.0051 with a t-statistic of 2.67 and -0.0088 with a t-statistic of 1.80, 
respectively, while in-state dummy a proxy for geographic distance has 0.0074 with a t-statistic of 
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2.59 and 0.0079 with a t-statistic of 2.77. In model (3) and (4), Uysal, et al. (2008)’s distance 
variables are all significant and consistent with their findings while our measures are still 
consistent with our conjecture. Thus, after controlling for the geographic factor, we still observe 
that corporate ideology variable is statically significant, indicating that our results are not driven 
by geographic factor.  
4.5.2. Mid-term Election 
Our local political ideology identification strategy uses local voter turnouts in presidential 
elections. The main reasons were stability of ideology and representativeness of local political 
ideology due to the higher participation rate for presidential elections. However, they take place 
every four years so that there could be potential ideology update issue. Thus, we reassign local 
ideology based upon all elections including mid-term elections taking place every two years.  
The results of Table 7 show that previous results still hold. In model (1) and (2), both variables 
indicate that the identical or close political ideology is associated with positive announcement 
returns abnormal returns. The coefficients of homogeneous dummy in model (1) and (2) are 0.074 
with a t-statistics=2.37 and is -0.0182 with a t-statistics=1.68, respectively. Model (3) and (4) also 
confirm that our results are robust to geographic factor.  
5. Conclusion 
We investigate the impact of difference in local political ideologies between acquirers and 
targets on the likelihood of deal completion and announcement returns over the period of 1981-
2009. We posit that increase in political ideology distance, as a proxy for corporate culture, 
between acquirer and target leads to greater risks/costs associated with the integration process, and 
hence less likely to complete deals and less favorable market response to merger announcements. 
Using probit models, we find that when political ideology distance between acquirer and target in 
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a merger are small, or when their ideologies are identical, deals are more likely to be completed. 
We also find that acquirer which are politically proximate to their targets earn significantly higher 
returns than distant acquirers. To check whether our results are driven by geographic factor, we 
re-run regression analyses with three geographic proxies. After controlling for the geographic 
effect and other determinants of announcement returns, the political ideology effect still exists. 
Finally, we reassign local ideology values to acquirer and targets based on all elections to mitigate 
potential update issue. The result with new local ideology values is still consistent with the 
previous results. Collectively, our evidences suggest that corporate political ideology have an 
impact on the probability of completing deals and in determining announcement returns, 
supporting “Cultural distance hypothesis”. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
The table reports summary statistics of our sample. The sample consists of 1,007 publicly traded U.S. firms and 2,100 
CEOs covered by the COMPUSTAT Execucomp with 12,928 CEO-year observations between 1993 and 2006. Panel 
A is the summary statistics of firms with conservative CEOs (taking value of 1) versus firms with non-conservative 
CEOs (taking value of 0). Panel B provides the correlations in CEOs characteristics. Financial variables are reported 
in $mil. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The definitions of other 
variables are in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
 All 1 0 Diff (1-2) 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean     
M&A Dummy 12,928 0.45 5,628 0.44 7,310 0.47 -0.03 *** 
Asset 12,928 8.51 5,628 8.61 7,310 8.43 0.19 *** 
Sales 12,928 8.01 5,628 8.16 7,310 7.90 0.26 *** 
Book to Market 12,928 0.45 5,628 0.46 7,310 0.44 0.02 *** 
Tobin's Q 12,928 2.17 5,628 2.03 7,310 2.28 -0.25 *** 
Profitability 12,928 0.11 5,628 0.12 7,310 0.11 0.01 *** 
Operating Margin 12,928 0.19 5,628 0.21 7,310 0.17 0.04 *** 
Free Cash Flow 12,928 0.08 5,628 0.09 7,310 0.08 0.01 *** 
ROA 12,928 0.13 5,628 0.14 7,310 0.13 0.01 *** 
Capital Expenditure 12,928 0.05 5,628 0.05 7,310 0.05 0.00 ** 
R&D 12,928 0.03 5,628 0.02 7,310 0.03 -0.01 *** 
Tangibility 12,928 0.30 5,628 0.33 7,310 0.28 0.05 *** 
Leverage 12,928 0.23 5,628 0.24 7,310 0.22 0.02 *** 
Firm Age 12,928 3.17 5,628 3.25 7,310 3.11 0.14 *** 
CEO Age 12,928 55.76 5,628 56.75 7,310 55.00 1.75 *** 
CEO Tenure 12,928 7.57 5,628 8.08 7,310 7.19 0.89 *** 
Gender 12,928 0.00 5,628 0.00 7,310 0.01 -0.01 *** 
Founder 12,928 0.06 5,628 0.06 7,310 0.06 0.00   
         
         
 
Panel B. Correlation  
 Conservative CEO Gender Age 
Conservative CEO 1   
Gender -0.041 1  
Age 0.117 -0.038 1 
Founder 0.001 -0.013 0.024 
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Table 2. Propensity to Engage in M&A Activity 
 
The table reports the results of probit regressions in (1) and (2) and the estimated relations between M&A decision 
and the level of capital expenditure using SUR (Seemingly unrelated regressions in (3) and (4). In (1) and (2), the 
dependent variable is binary where 1 signifies that the CEO engages in M&A in a given year. In (3) and (4), M&A 
binary variable and the level of capital expenditure normalized by total asset are used as dependent variables. 
Conservative CEO (Dummy) is binary where 1 signifies that the CEO donates only to Republicans. Conservative CEO 
is defined as the difference between the CEO’s political contributions to Republican and Democratic party-affiliated 
candidates or party committees divided by the CEO’s total contribution s to Republican and Democrat-affiliated 
committees. In parentheses are t-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm 
and year. and clustering by firm and year. All models are estimated with the year and industry fixed effects. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The definitions of other variables are in 
the Appendix. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables M&A M&A M&A 
Capital 
Expenditure M&A 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Conservative CEO Dummy -0.0789**  -0.0181** 0.0016**   
 (-2.04)  (-2.11) (2.10)   
Conservative CEO  -0.0596*   -0.0127* 0.0016*** 
  (-1.80)   (-1.75) (2.61) 
CEO age -1.2322*** -1.2414*** -0.2814*** -0.0019 -0.2836*** -0.0018 
 (-7.51) (-7.57) (-7.99) (-0.63) (-8.06) (-0.60) 
Tenure 0.1147*** 0.1121*** 0.0250*** 0.0017*** 0.0243*** 0.0018*** 
 (4.78) (4.67) (4.75) (3.74) (4.64) (3.87) 
Female Dummy 0.1073 0.1166 0.0446 -0.0152** 0.0470 -0.0153*** 
 (0.34) (0.37) (0.65) (-2.55) (0.69) (-2.58) 
Founder Dummy 0.0208 0.0216 0.0034 0.0014 0.0037 0.0014 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.21) (1.03) (0.23) (1.01) 
Size 0.2316*** 0.2299*** 0.0507*** -0.0014*** 0.0503*** -0.0013*** 
 (15.60) (15.50) (15.99) (-4.91) (15.87) (-4.77) 
Tobin's Q 0.0249** 0.0249** 0.0042*** 0.0006*** 0.0042*** 0.0006*** 
 (2.09) (2.09) (3.17) (4.93) (3.17) (4.93) 
Free cash flow -1.2252*** -1.2260*** -0.1647*** -0.0497*** -0.1649*** -0.0498*** 
 (-4.44) (-4.43) (-3.77) (-13.12) (-3.77) (-13.14) 
Leverage 0.7458*** 0.7394*** 0.1569*** 0.0006 0.1552*** 0.0007 
 (5.48) (5.43) (5.49) (0.24) (5.44) (0.29) 
Capital Expenditure -2.6636*** -2.6597***     
 (-5.25) (-5.24)     
R&D Expenditure 0.9492** 0.9661** 0.2476** -0.0440*** 0.2516** -0.0443*** 
 (2.05) (2.08) (2.51) (-5.14) (2.55) (-5.19) 
Industry Competition -5.2498* -5.1882 -1.3659** 0.2801*** -1.3531** 0.2800*** 
 (-1.66) (-1.64) (-2.07) (4.91) (-2.06) (4.91) 
High Tech Dummy 0.5896*** 0.5877*** 0.1457*** 0.0016 0.1454*** 0.0017 
 (9.88) (9.85) (11.35) (1.44) (11.32) (1.48) 
Constant 2.1889*** 2.2254*** 0.9496*** 0.0764*** 0.9578*** 0.0760*** 
 (3.30) (3.36) (6.63) (6.16) (6.69) (6.13) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,928 12,928 12,928 12,928 12,928 12,928 
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.34 0.11 0.34 
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Table 3. CEO Conservatism and Method of Payment, Type of Target, and Focus 
The table displays the results of probit regressions with different dependent variables. The dependent variable in (1) 
and (2) is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the M&A was financed using only stock. The dependent variable in 
(3) and (4) is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the type of target firm in M&A is private.  In the (5) and (6), the 
dependent variable is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the first two digits of SICs of acquirer and target are 
same. Conservative CEO (Dummy) is binary where 1 signifies that the CEO donates only to Republicans. 
Conservative CEO is defined as the difference between the CEO’s political contributions to Republican and 
Democratic party-affiliated candidates or party committees divided by the CEO’s total contributions to Republican 
and Democrat-affiliated committees. . In parentheses are t-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm and year. and clustering by firm and year. All models are estimated with the year and industry 
fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The definitions of 
other variables are in the Appendix. 
  Method of payments Type of target Focus-increasing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Conservative CEO Dummy -0.3381***  -0.1959***  0.0869*  
 (-4.42)  (-3.07)  (1.79)  
Conservative CEO  -0.2768***  -0.1749***  0.0917** 
  (-4.13)  (-3.19)  (2.25) 
CEO age -0.7616** -0.8104*** -0.1644 -0.1940 0.8476*** 0.8524*** 
 (-2.51) (-2.68) (-0.65) (-0.76) (4.07) (4.10) 
Tenure 0.1007** 0.0951* -0.0458 -0.0506 -0.0630** -0.0601** 
 (2.07) (1.95) (-1.12) (-1.24) (-2.12) (-2.03) 
Female Dummy 0.2678 0.3092 -0.4013 -0.3776 0.5489 0.5452 
 (0.55) (0.64) (-0.94) (-0.89) (1.51) (1.50) 
Founder Dummy 0.1746 0.1792 0.0020 0.0074 0.3338*** 0.3325*** 
 (1.25) (1.28) (0.02) (0.07) (3.29) (3.27) 
Size -0.1897*** -0.1983*** -0.1879*** -0.1934*** -0.3342*** -0.3318*** 
 (-6.27) (-6.55) (-6.92) (-7.11) (-17.98) (-17.89) 
Tobin's Q 0.1172*** 0.1149*** 0.0360** 0.0356** -0.0152*** -0.0151*** 
 (3.62) (3.57) (2.22) (2.23) (-2.79) (-2.78) 
Free cash flow -2.8990*** -2.9303*** -0.4580 -0.4614 0.4455* 0.4390* 
 (-6.53) (-6.62) (-1.30) (-1.31) (1.81) (1.79) 
Leverage -2.2610*** -2.2867*** -0.5479** -0.5496** -0.4040*** -0.3995*** 
 (-8.08) (-8.20) (-2.35) (-2.37) (-2.66) (-2.63) 
Dividend Dummy -0.0858 -0.0719   1.5258** 1.5007** 
 (-0.56) (-0.46)   (2.08) (2.06) 
Industry Competition -27.0132*** -27.5371*** -12.7932** -12.7220** 8.1020** 8.1133** 
 (-2.66) (-2.69) (-2.07) (-2.06) (2.00) (2.01) 
High Tech Dummy 0.3296*** 0.3343*** 0.3637*** 0.3652*** 0.1048 0.1081 
 (3.30) (3.35) (4.61) (4.62) (1.48) (1.52) 
Deal Value 0.2073*** 0.2064*** -0.2909*** -0.2913*** -1.0357** -1.0459** 
 (7.63) (7.58) (-10.91) (-10.93) (-2.04) (-2.06) 
Relative Value -0.1473 -0.1569 -2.7087*** -2.7106***   
 (-1.14) (-1.21) (-5.26) (-5.26)   
Focus Dummy 0.0420 0.0490 -0.3293*** -0.3265***   
 (0.53) (0.61) (-4.96) (-4.92)   
Public Target Dummy 1.0376*** 1.0367***     
 (12.34) (12.31)     
Stock Payment Dummy   0.7219*** 0.7237***   
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   (9.00) (9.03)   
Constant 3.0071** 3.2246** 3.4336*** 3.5632*** 1.9295** 1.9544** 
 (2.31) (2.49) (3.26) (3.39) (2.23) (2.25) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,830 5,830 5,830 5,830 5,830 5,830 
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Table 4. Market Response to Announcement of M&A Bids 
The table reports market response to the announcement of M&A bids. The event window is from the one-day before 
through the one day after the announcement of the bid. The dependent variable is the Cumulative abnormal return on 
the bidder’s stock from the one-day before through the one day after the announcement of the bid. Cumulative 
abnormal returns are calculated by taking the daily return on the bidder’s common equity and subtracting expected 
returns. Expected returns are the daily return on the CRSP value-weighted index. In parentheses are t-values based on 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and year. All models are estimated with the year 
and firm fixed effects.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The 
definitions of other variables are in the Appendix. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
Conservative CEO dummy 0.0015  0.0049  
 (0.76)  (0.94)  
Conservative CEO   0.0009  0.0049 
  (0.52)  (1.21) 
Price run-up -0.0050 -0.0049 -0.0084 -0.0083 
 (-1.08) (-1.08) (-1.24) (-1.24) 
Target Premium   -0.0000 -0.0000 
   (-0.28) (-0.29) 
Female Dummy -0.0215 -0.0218 -0.1095** -0.1094** 
 (-0.82) (-0.83) (-1.99) (-2.00) 
CEO age 0.0101 0.0103 0.0310 0.0319 
 (1.10) (1.13) (1.56) (1.61) 
Tenure -0.0031** -0.0031** -0.0047 -0.0045 
 (-2.15) (-2.13) (-1.52) (-1.48) 
Founder Dummy 0.0093** 0.0093** 0.0082 0.0082 
 (2.41) (2.41) (0.82) (0.82) 
Focus Dummy 0.0006 0.0006 0.0017 0.0015 
 (0.27) (0.26) (0.36) (0.33) 
Stock Payment Dummy -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0008 -0.0008 
 (-1.01) (-1.03) (-0.16) (-0.16) 
Public Target Dummy -0.0176*** -0.0176*** 0.0221 0.0227 
 (-5.77) (-5.74) (0.63) (0.65) 
Deal Attitude 0.0052 0.0053 0.0113 0.0114 
 (0.63) (0.63) (1.31) (1.31) 
Deal Value -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0082*** -0.0081*** 
 (-0.00) (-0.00) (-4.43) (-4.42) 
Relative Value -0.0169*** -0.0168*** -0.0096 -0.0096 
 (-2.71) (-2.69) (-1.02) (-1.02) 
Tender Offer 0.0122** 0.0122** 0.0132** 0.0132** 
 (2.57) (2.57) (2.37) (2.39) 
Size -0.0033*** -0.0033*** 0.0053** 0.0053** 
 (-3.26) (-3.24) (2.43) (2.46) 
Tobin's Q 0.0009** 0.0009** 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 
 (2.10) (2.09) (6.30) (6.30) 
Free cash flow -0.0084 -0.0081 -0.0992 -0.0974 
 (-0.24) (-0.23) (-0.90) (-0.90) 
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Leverage 0.0132 0.0134 0.0490* 0.0495** 
 (1.38) (1.40) (1.93) (1.98) 
Capital Expenditure 0.0245 0.0247 -0.0317 -0.0307 
 (0.90) (0.90) (-0.38) (-0.37) 
R&D Expenditure -0.0261 -0.0263 -0.0147 -0.0146 
 (-0.79) (-0.80) (-0.16) (-0.16) 
High Tech Dummy 0.0009 0.0009 0.0019 0.0018 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) 
Industry Competition -0.2613* -0.2620* 0.1586 0.1544 
 (-1.68) (-1.68) (0.25) (0.24) 
Constant 0.0223 0.0213 -0.1982** -0.2027** 
 (0.57) (0.55) (-2.16) (-2.23) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,623 4,623 1,100 1,100 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.13 
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Table 5. Long-Run Performance 
 
This table reports the long-term buy-and-hold average abnormal returns over holding periods that extend from one to 
five years following M&A announcements. The buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for each event firm is 
calculated in the table as: 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(𝑖,𝑎,𝑏) = ∏(𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 1) − ∏(
𝑏
𝑡=𝑎
𝑏
𝑡=𝑎
𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 1) 
Where ER(i,a,b) = Excess return for event firm i over the time period from day a to day b, Rit is the return on the 
common stock of event firm i on day t, and Rmt is the return on the stock of the matched firm on day t. Matched firms 
are selected using the following sets of matching criteria: size and ratio of book to market value of equity. The post-
announcement long-term abnormal returns do not include the abnormal returns over days -1 through 0 relative to the 
announcement date. If an event firm is delisted before the end of a buy-and-hold period, its truncated return series is 
still included in the analysis, and it is assumed to earn the daily return of the benchmark for the remainder of the period. 
The statistical significance of each of the BHAARs is tested using the parametric t-test, based on the cross sectional 
standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
Mean Buy-and-Hold Average Abnormal Returns (%) 
  
    Number of obs. 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
(1) Full sample 3,557 -4.42 -7.83 -5.88 -5.67 -5.74 
(2) Conservative 637 0.65 -0.21 -1.74 7.05 11.27 
(3) Non-conservative 2,920 -5.53 -9.95 -6.79 -8.45 -9.46 
Difference(2)-(3)  6.19** 9.3* 5.05 15.5** 20.73** 
t-statistic for difference   (2.15) (1.77) (0.84) (2.26) (2.31) 
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Table 6. Cross Sectional Regression of BHAR on Conservative CEOs 
 
This table reports the results of the cross-sectional regression analysis of the post-announcement buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns to the M&A-event firms BHARj on conservative CEO measures with the several control variables. 
The specified model is: 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸_𝐶𝐸𝑂 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝐽 
 
In parentheses are t-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The definitions of other variables are in the Appendix. 
 
Variables   (1)   (2) 
Conservative CEO(Dummy)  0.220**   
  (1.93)   
Conservative CEO    0.109* 
    (1.73) 
CEO age  0.878***  0.859*** 
  (2.77)  (2.72) 
Tenure  -0.105***  -0.104*** 
  (-2.78)  (-2.77) 
Female dummy  0.365  0.384 
  (1.25)  (1.32) 
Deal size  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-0.97)  (-0.84) 
Relative size  0.340**  0.342** 
  (2.08)  (2.09) 
Private target  0.133  0.129 
  (1.57)  (1.52) 
Subsidiary target  0.146  0.151 
  (1.54)  (1.58) 
Stock payment  0.0001  0.001 
  (0.24)  (0.14) 
Cash payment  -0.0001  -0.001 
  (-1.40)  (-1.39) 
Acquirer Size  0.03  0.025 
  (1.29)  (1.08) 
Deal attitude  -0.206  -0.216 
  (-1.08)  (-1.13) 
Tender offer  -0.111  -0.106 
  (-1.00)  (-0.96) 
     
Adj. R-squared (%)  0.50  0.42 
Observations   3,501   3,501 
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Table 7. CEO Conservatism and Overconfidence 
 
The panel A in the table shows the correlation between conservative and overconfidence measure (Malmendier and 
Tate (2005)). The panel B repeats the previous regression analysis with overconfidence measure. The dependent 
variable in model (1) is binary where 1 signifies that the CEO engages in M&A in a given year. The dependent variable 
in model (2) is binary where 1 signifies that the CEO use stock as a method of payment for merger bid. The dependent 
variable in model (3) is binary where 1 signifies that the firm made a focus-increasing merger bid in a given year.  The 
dependent variable in model (4) is the CAR (cumulative abnormal return) on the bidder’s stock from the two-day 
before through the two day after the announcement of the bid. The dependent variable in model (5) is the 5-year 
BHAR (post-announcement buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The coefficients in model (1), (2) and (3) are presented 
as odds ratios. All standard errors in Panel B are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and year. p-values 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The 
definitions of other variables are in the Appendix. 
  
 
Panel A. Correlations with confidence and conservatism 
  
Conservative   Overconfidence 
Conservatism 1     
Overconfidence -0.033   1 
    
Panel B. Previous regressions with confidence and conservatism  measures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Conservatism 0.85** 0.69*** 1.21* -0.00 0.22** 
 (0.02) (0.003) (0.09) (0.99) (0.04) 
Overconfidence 1.42*** 1.59*** 0.86 0.65*** 0.29 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.67) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 9,766 3,569 3,569 3,568 3,501 
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Table 8. Sample Distribution by Announcement Year 
 
The table reports the number of mergers and acquisitions by announcement year. The sample consists of 17,126 U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1981 and 
2009 where the acquiring firm is only a public and a target is a public, private or subsidiary.  Deals are classified as homogenous if the counties of the acquirer 
and the target support same political party in a certain presidential election. Transactions are classified as in-state deal if the acquirer and the target are located in 
same state and classified as local deal if the acquirer and target are located within 100km of each other. 
              Type of targets Method of payment 
year 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
Percentage of 
Acquisitions 
Deal Value 
($ Mil) Homogeneous Deals In-State Deals Local deals Public Private Subsidiary Cash Stock Mix 
1981 71 0.41% 539.46 0.44 0.18 0.16 0.52 0.18 0.30 0.03 0.00 0.97 
1982 93 0.54% 195.40 0.65 0.29 0.26 0.58 0.12 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1983 95 0.55% 126.84 0.62 0.23 0.18 0.37 0.27 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1984 190 1.11% 294.46 0.66 0.29 0.25 0.47 0.28 0.26 0.08 0.03 0.88 
1985 243 1.42% 632.55 0.58 0.21 0.18 0.47 0.12 0.41 0.30 0.10 0.60 
1986 473 2.76% 232.76 0.60 0.20 0.20 0.34 0.27 0.39 0.33 0.06 0.61 
1987 347 2.03% 216.84 0.61 0.23 0.17 0.44 0.23 0.33 0.30 0.10 0.60 
1988 445 2.60% 256.86 0.64 0.20 0.17 0.38 0.22 0.40 0.30 0.06 0.63 
1989 408 2.38% 336.11 0.62 0.22 0.18 0.41 0.25 0.34 0.22 0.10 0.67 
1990 263 1.54% 304.39 0.62 0.27 0.24 0.43 0.35 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.67 
1991 275 1.61% 166.00 0.61 0.24 0.17 0.34 0.42 0.25 0.14 0.15 0.71 
1992 408 2.38% 147.97 0.59 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.44 0.34 0.16 0.17 0.67 
1993 845 4.93% 188.03 0.59 0.25 0.19 0.15 0.47 0.38 0.19 0.12 0.69 
1994 969 5.66% 193.79 0.58 0.17 0.14 0.20 0.49 0.31 0.20 0.15 0.65 
1995 1187 6.93% 248.96 0.57 0.18 0.13 0.20 0.49 0.31 0.18 0.18 0.64 
1996 1255 7.33% 378.63 0.59 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.53 0.25 0.20 0.16 0.64 
1997 1256 7.33% 366.22 0.61 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.55 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.66 
1998 910 5.31% 1157.53 0.64 0.20 0.17 0.39 0.45 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.62 
1999 755 4.41% 1452.21 0.64 0.23 0.17 0.47 0.39 0.15 0.18 0.27 0.55 
2000 943 5.51% 1460.74 0.66 0.24 0.18 0.36 0.47 0.17 0.15 0.31 0.54 
2001 568 3.32% 962.88 0.59 0.22 0.18 0.40 0.44 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.60 
2002 494 2.88% 537.07 0.61 0.29 0.21 0.32 0.49 0.19 0.32 0.12 0.57 
2003 564 3.29% 319.56 0.58 0.27 0.21 0.30 0.50 0.20 0.34 0.10 0.56 
2004 686 4.01% 514.97 0.60 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.61 0.17 0.34 0.08 0.58 
2005 742 4.33% 1051.67 0.62 0.20 0.15 0.23 0.61 0.16 0.36 0.07 0.57 
2006 803 4.69% 946.01 0.59 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.59 0.20 0.33 0.05 0.62 
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2007 811 4.74% 637.00 0.65 0.19 0.15 0.22 0.58 0.20 0.36 0.03 0.60 
2008 588 3.43% 582.35 0.62 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.60 0.19 0.29 0.04 0.68 
2009 439 2.56% 1503.03 0.70 0.27 0.24 0.37 0.49 0.14 0.28 0.09 0.64 
Total 17,126 100% 550.01 0.61 0.22 0.18 0.33 0.41 0.26 0.22 0.11 0.67 
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Table 9. Summary Statistics 
The table reports summary statistics of our sample. The sample consists of 17,126 U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1981 and 2009 where the acquiring firm 
is only a public and a target is a public, private or subsidiary.  Deals are classified as homogenous if the counties of the acquirer and the target support same political 
party in recent presidential election. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%,5%, and 1 % levels, respectively. The definitions of other variables are in the 
Appendix. 
   
Homogeneous 
(1)    
Heterogeneous 
(2)      
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Difference t-statistic 
Panel A. Deal Characteristics             (1)-(2)   
Public Target (Dummy) 0.30 0 0.45 0.27 0 0.44 0.02*** (3.35) 
Private Target (Dummy) 0.46 0 0.50 0.45 0 0.58 0.01 (-0.25) 
Subsidiary Target (Dummy) 0.23 0 0.41 0.27 0 0.43 -0.03*** (4.15) 
Cash payment (Dummy) 0.22 0 0.49 0.23 0 0.50 -0.01* (-1.75) 
Stock payment (Dummy) 0.14 0 0.42 0.11 0 0.39 0.03*** (4.96) 
Mix payment (Dummy) 0.41 0 0.47 0.43 0 0.47 -0.17* (-1.95) 
Focusing acquisition (Dummy) 0.57 1 0.49 0.55 1 0.0.02 0.02** (2.60) 
High tech (Dummy) 0.29 0 0.45 0.24 0 0.43 0.041*** (5.68) 
Deal value ($mil) 534.8 80 2501.7 768.1 74.9 5105.4 -233.4** (-2.31) 
Relative deal size 0.51 0.12 3.68 0.32 0.11 1.25 0.03 (0.62) 
Tender offer 0.05 0 0.23 0.05 0 0.23 0 (0.00) 
Panel B. Bidder Characteristics                 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Difference t-statistic 
Total asset($mil) 1,979 259.06 7785.30 2,136 287.15 8546.36 -158.2 (-0.95) 
Market value of equity ($mil) 3,055 379.17 14,290.59 3,101 380.80 13,545.88 -46.06 (-0.16) 
Tobin's Q 2.64 1.72 5.41 2.38 1.68 3.44 0.25*** (2.64) 
Free cash flow 0.03 0.08 0.21 0.04 0.08 0.19 -0.013*** (-3.11) 
Market leverage 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.14 -0.007*** (-2.58) 
ROA 0.09 0.13 0.21 0.10 0.13 0.18 -0.012*** (-2.87) 
Capital expenditure 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.001 (0.84) 
Cash holding 0.21 0.11 0.23 0.18 0.09 0.21 0.027*** (5.82) 
         
 
  
 
 
65 
 
Table 10. Propensity to Complete Deals 
 
With 17,126 all U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1981 and 2009, we estimate probit model and report the results.  
The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the deal is completed and 0 otherwise. In the model (1), Homogeneous 
acquisition (Dummy) is binary where 1 signifies that the acquirer and the target locals subscribe same political 
ideology determined with the recent president election outcomes. In the model (2), Homogeneous acquisition is 
defined as the absolute value of difference between local political ideologies of acquirer and target in terms of margin 
of victory. In parentheses are t-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. All regressions control 
for year and industry fixed effects. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
The definitions of other variables are in the Appendix. 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
Homogeneous acquisition(Dummy) 0.2597**  
 (1.98)  
Homogeneous acquisition(Continuous)  -0.2682* 
  (-1.95) 
Geographical Distance 0.0073 0.0056 
 (0.39) (0.31) 
CAR[-1,1] 0.6062** 0.6013** 
 (2.54) (2.52) 
Focus acquisition 0.1250** 0.1234** 
 (2.57) (2.53) 
Deal attitude(Friendly) 3.2920*** 3.2848*** 
 (23.62) (23.58) 
Litigation Dummy -0.1976 -0.1940 
 (-1.09) (-1.07) 
Repeated bidder -0.0192*** -0.0192*** 
 (-5.31) (-5.31) 
High tech 0.1769*** 0.1765*** 
 (2.86) (2.86) 
Tender 1.8084*** 1.8075*** 
 (10.64) (10.63) 
Public target  -0.1489** -0.1536** 
 (-2.14) (-2.21) 
Private target  0.0276 0.0238 
 (0.46) (0.40) 
Firm age -0.0286 -0.0294 
 (-0.86) (-0.89) 
Firm Size 0.1615*** 0.1618*** 
 (10.38) (10.43) 
Free cash flow 0.3345*** 0.3319*** 
 (3.04) (3.04) 
Leverage -0.1728 -0.1713 
 (-1.03) (-1.02) 
Population -0.0095 -0.0085 
 (-0.75) (-0.67) 
Education 0.0053 0.0058 
 (1.32) (1.42) 
Income -0.0112 -0.0078 
 (-0.58) (-0.40) 
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Gender 0.0273 0.0806 
 (0.05) (0.14) 
Religious 0.0188 0.0305 
 (0.08) (0.12) 
Ethnicity -0.0758 -0.0125 
 (-0.33) (-0.05) 
Constant -2.3652*** -2.1009*** 
 (-8.16) (-8.01) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 17,126 17,126 
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Table 11. Univariate Market Response 
 
The table reports the results of univariate test with 12,075 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1981 
and 2009 where the acquiring firm is only a public and a target is a public, private or subsidiary.  Homogeneous 
acquisition is binary where 1 signifies that the acquirer and the target locals subscribe same political ideology 
determined with the recent president election outcomes. We follow standard event study methodology to compute 
acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the three-day period (-1, 1) around the announcement date. 
We estimate the abnormal returns using a market adjusted model: . 
ARi = ri − rm 
where ri is the return on acquirer i and rm is the daily return on the CRSP value-weighted index. *,**,and *** 
represent significance at the 10%,5%, and 1 % levels, respectively.  The definitions of other variables are in the 
Appendix. 
Panel A. Announcement Abnormal Returns   
   Method of Payment Type of Target 
    Full Sample Cash Mix Stock   Public  Private  Subsidiary  
CAR Mean 1.45%*** 1.64%*** 1.71%*** 0.65%*  -0.96%*** 2.18%*** 2.76%*** 
(-2, +2) Median 0.47%*** 0.87%*** 0.57%*** -0.83%***  -1.04%*** 0.91%*** 1.29%*** 
Panel B. Announcement Abnormal Returns By Political Orientation   
Full Sample   Method of Payment Type of Target 
    Full Sample Cash Mix Stock   Public  Private  Subsidiary  
CAR  (-2, +2) Homogenous 1.67% 1.75% 2.02% 0.98%  -0.80% 2.49% 3.03% 
  (6,017) (2,413) (2,220) (1,384)  (1,704) (2,999) (1,314) 
 Heterogeneous 1.11% 1.48% 1.22% 0.00%  -1.26% 1.69% 2.40% 
  (3,832) (1,719) (1,392) (721)  (984) (1,900) (948) 
 Difference 0.57%** 0.18% 0.81** 0.98%  0.46% 0.80%** 0.63% 
  [2.40] [1.04] [2.07] [1.36]  [1.06] [2.24] [1.50] 
10%> Margin of Victory   Method of Payment Type of Target 
    Full Sample Cash Mix Stock   Public  Private  Subsidiary  
CAR  (-2, +2) Homogenous 1.65% 1.64% 2.05% 0.96%  -0.96% 2.70% 2.82% 
  (4,697) (1,888) (1,759) (1,050)  (1,379) (2,305) (1,013) 
 Heterogeneous 0.77% 1.32% 1.01% -1.02%  -1.66% 1.38% 2.15% 
  (2,999) (1,356) (1,090) (553)  (778) (1,489) (732) 
 Difference 0.87%*** 0.32% 1.04%** 2.01%**  0.70% 1.32%*** 0.67% 
  [3.22] [1.09] [2.32] [2.41]  [1.47] [3.14] [1.42] 
15%> Margin of Victory   Method of Payment Type of Target 
    Full Sample Cash Mix Stock   Public  Private  Subsidiary  
CAR  (-2, +2) Homogenous 1.85% 1.45% 2.36% 1.65%  -0.59% 2.94% 2.72% 
  (3,170) (1,287) (1,249) (634)  (937) (1,533) (700) 
 Heterogeneous 0.77% 1.30% 0.77% -0.06%  -2.04% 1.38% 2.27% 
  (1,926) (884) (708) (334)  (471) (967) (488) 
 Difference 1.08%*** 0.16% 1.58%*** 2.26%**  1.45%** 1.55%*** 0.46% 
  [3.13] [0.42] [2.95] [1.92]  [2.36] [2.89] [0.79] 
20%> Margin of Victory   Method of Payment Type of Target 
    Full Sample Cash Mix Stock   Public  Private  Subsidiary  
CAR  (-2, +2) Homogenous 2.68% 2.65% 3.82% 0.07%  0.04% 3.81% 3.98% 
  (893) (383) (339) (171)  (277) (395) (218) 
 Heterogeneous -0.19% -0.02% 0.43% -2.51%  -3.85% 1.19% 0.79% 
  (360) (180) (131) (49)  (91) (169) (100) 
 Difference 2.88%*** 2.67%*** 3.29%*** 3.22%  3.90%*** 2.62%*** 3.19%** 
  [4.32] [3.21] [2.92] [1.44]  [3.31] [2.63] [2.54] 
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Table 12. Market Response to Announcement 
The table reports the results of regression analysis with 12,075 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1981 
and 2009 where the acquiring firm is only a public and a target is a public, private or subsidiary.  Homogeneous 
acquisition (Dummy) is binary where 1 signifies that the acquirer and the target locals subscribe same political 
ideology determined with the recent president election outcomes. Homogeneous acquisition (continuous) is defined 
as the absolute value of difference between local political ideologies of acquirer and target in terms of margin of 
victory. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. All models are estimated with the year and industry fixed. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The definitions of other variables 
are in the Appendix. 
 
  Full sample 10%> Margin of Victory 15%> Margin of Victory 20%> Margin of Victory 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Homogenous (Dummy) 0.0057***  0.0091***  0.0136***  0.0199***  
 (2.99)  (3.01)  (3.33)  (2.65)  
Homogeneous 
acquisition(Continuous)  -0.0099**  -0.0148**  -0.0206***  -0.0241* 
  (-2.03)  (-2.38)  (-2.83)  (-1.82) 
Focus acquisition -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0060** 0.0060** 0.0063* 0.0065* 0.0018 0.0017 
 (-0.23) (-0.22) (1.98) (1.99) (1.72) (1.77) (0.33) (0.31) 
Relative size 0.0038 0.0038 0.0137*** 0.0138*** 0.0195*** 0.0196*** 0.0199*** 0.0198*** 
 (1.55) (1.55) (3.99) (4.01) (5.27) (5.31) (3.10) (3.08) 
High tech -0.009*** -0.0100*** -0.0134*** -0.0138*** -0.0129*** -0.0132*** 0.0040 0.0031 
 (-3.75) (-3.80) (-3.47) (-3.56) (-2.77) (-2.85) (0.45) (0.36) 
Public target -0.031*** -0.0308*** -0.0353*** -0.0358*** -0.0434*** -0.0438*** -0.0438*** -0.0439*** 
 (-10.97) (-11.00) (-8.38) (-8.47) (-8.45) (-8.50) (-5.82) (-5.80) 
Cash payment 0.0046** 0.0045** 0.0028 0.0028 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0024 -0.0034 
 (2.35) (2.33) (0.98) (0.97) (0.11) (0.14) (-0.43) (-0.59) 
Tender offer 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0071 0.0071 0.0056 0.0058 -0.0002 -0.0008 
 (3.40) (3.42) (1.55) (1.57) (1.01) (1.05) (-0.02) (-0.08) 
Deal attitude(Friendly) -0.0054 -0.0059 -0.0079 -0.0082 -0.0111 -0.0119 0.0013 0.0015 
 (-1.09) (-1.19) (-1.14) (-1.19) (-1.41) (-1.52) (0.12) (0.14) 
Firm age 0.0024 0.0024 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0042 -0.0042 -0.0018 -0.0019 
 (1.53) (1.51) (-1.48) (-1.46) (-1.55) (-1.56) (-0.45) (-0.49) 
Firm size -0.005*** -0.0052*** -0.0025** -0.0024** -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0037* -0.0036* 
 (-6.98) (-6.90) (-2.56) (-2.48) (-0.72) (-0.65) (-1.78) (-1.76) 
Free cash flow -0.0030 -0.0032 0.0191 0.0193 0.0196 0.0195 0.0169 0.0174 
 (-0.26) (-0.28) (1.14) (1.15) (0.99) (0.99) (0.66) (0.68) 
ROA -0.043*** -0.0432*** -0.0436*** -0.0442*** -0.0451** -0.0451** -0.0152 -0.0162 
 (-2.85) (-2.86) (-2.67) (-2.69) (-2.37) (-2.37) (-0.43) (-0.45) 
Leverage 0.0035 0.0032 0.0086 0.0084 0.0093 0.0095 0.0025 0.0028 
 (0.67) (0.61) (0.98) (0.96) (0.94) (0.96) (0.15) (0.17) 
Tobin's q -0.002*** -0.0019*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0011** -0.0011** -0.0014 -0.0015* 
 (-5.13) (-5.11) (-4.11) (-4.09) (-2.46) (-2.41) (-1.59) (-1.69) 
Industry competition 0.0130 0.0113 0.0685 0.0678 -0.0526 -0.0577 0.0966 0.0631 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.54) (0.53) (-0.35) (-0.38) (0.41) (0.27) 
Population 0.0004 0.0003 0.0011 0.0009 0.0012 0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.93) (0.67) (1.62) (1.38) (1.48) (1.25) (-0.11) (-0.23) 
Income -0.0012* -0.0011 -0.0019* -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0009 
 (-1.77) (-1.54) (-1.87) (-1.58) (-1.50) (-1.21) (-0.63) (-0.47) 
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Gender -0.0428** -0.0406** -0.0095 -0.0035 -0.0086 0.0032 -0.0189 -0.0117 
 (-2.08) (-1.97) (-0.34) (-0.12) (-0.24) (0.09) (-0.44) (-0.28) 
Religious -0.0214** -0.0208** -0.0422*** -0.0410*** -0.0594*** -0.0591*** -0.0406* -0.0389* 
 (-2.43) (-2.36) (-3.26) (-3.17) (-3.71) (-3.70) (-1.75) (-1.69) 
Ethnicity -0.0078 -0.0048 -0.0026 0.0000 -0.0017 0.0020 0.0635** 0.0587* 
 (-0.92) (-0.54) (-0.21) (0.00) (-0.11) (0.13) (2.23) (1.80) 
MSA -0.0091 -0.0091 -0.0031 -0.0037 -0.0004 -0.0013 0.0155 0.0161 
 (-1.05) (-1.05) (-0.22) (-0.27) (-0.03) (-0.09) (1.03) (1.06) 
Constant 0.0721*** 0.0782*** 0.0610*** 0.0712*** 0.0630*** 0.0787*** 0.0292 0.0501 
 (5.20) (5.71) (2.96) (3.50) (2.72) (3.48) (0.88) (1.59) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,075 12,075 5,772 5,772 4,203 4,203 1,499 1,499 
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.14 
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Table 13. Local Political Ideology and Geographical Distance  
 
The table reports the results of regression analysis with 12,075 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1981 and 2009 where the acquiring firm is only 
a public and a target is a public, private or subsidiary. Homogeneous acquisition (Dummy) is binary where 1 signifies that the acquirer and the target locals subscribe 
same political ideology determined with the recent president election outcomes. Homogeneous acquisition (continuous) is defined as the absolute value of difference 
between local political ideologies of acquirer and target in terms of margin of victory. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. All models are estimated 
with the year and industry fixed. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels, respectively.  The definitions of other variables are in the 
Appendix. 
 
  Full sample Full sample Full sample 10%> Margin of Victory 15%> Margin of Victory 20%> Margin of Victory 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Homogenous (Dummy) 0.0051***  0.0055***  0.0055***  0.0088***  0.0132***  0.0204***  
 (2.67)  (2.89)  (2.89)  (2.90)  (3.24)  (2.69)  
Homogeneous 
acquisition(Continuous)  -0.0088*  -0.0103**  -0.0105**  -0.0154**  -0.021***  -0.0247* 
  (-1.80)  (-2.10)  (-2.16)  (-2.47)  (-2.94)  (-1.85) 
In-state (Dummy) 0.0074*** 0.0079***           
 (2.59) (2.77)           
Local (Dummy)   0.0067* 0.0075**         
   (1.79) (1.99)         
Geographical Distance     -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003 -0.002 
     (-2.95) (-3.10) (-2.34) (-2.52) (-2.38) (-2.58) (-1.16) (-1.10) 
Focus acquisition -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0060** 0.0060** 0.0064* 0.0066* 0.0020 0.0019 
 (-0.18) (-0.17) (-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.21) (-0.20) (1.99) (2.00) (1.75) (1.81) (0.36) (0.34) 
Relative size 0.0038 0.0038 0.0038 0.0038 0.0038 0.0038 0.0136*** 0.0136*** 0.0193*** 0.0195*** 0.0198*** 0.0197*** 
 (1.56) (1.56) (1.55) (1.56) (1.56) (1.56) (3.93) (3.95) (5.27) (5.30) (3.10) (3.07) 
High tech -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 0.005 0.004 
 (-3.84) (-3.89) (-3.81) (-3.87) (-3.71) (-3.76) (-3.46) (-3.56) (-2.79) (-2.88) (0.52) (0.43) 
Public target -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 (-11.07) (-11.10) (-11.01) (-11.05) (-10.96) (-11.00) (-8.36) (-8.45) (-8.43) (-8.49) (-5.86) (-5.84) 
Cash payment 0.0047** 0.0046** 0.0046** 0.0046** 0.0046** 0.0046** 0.0028 0.0028 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0027 -0.0036 
 (2.41) (2.38) (2.37) (2.36) (2.36) (2.35) (0.97) (0.97) (0.12) (0.15) (-0.47) (-0.63) 
Tender offer 0.0110*** 0.0110*** 0.0110*** 0.0110*** 0.0111*** 0.0112*** 0.0072 0.0073 0.0057 0.0059 0.0000 -0.0005 
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 (3.45) (3.46) (3.45) (3.46) (3.49) (3.50) (1.59) (1.62) (1.03) (1.07) (0.01) (-0.06) 
Deal attitude(Friendly) -0.0052 -0.0056 -0.0052 -0.0056 -0.0051 -0.0056 -0.0075 -0.0078 -0.0103 -0.0110 0.0022 0.0024 
 (-1.04) (-1.12) (-1.04) (-1.13) (-1.02) (-1.12) (-1.08) (-1.13) (-1.31) (-1.41) (0.20) (0.21) 
Firm age 0.0025 0.0025 0.0024 0.0024 0.0023 0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0032 -0.0042 -0.0042 -0.0020 -0.0021 
 (1.57) (1.56) (1.55) (1.53) (1.48) (1.46) (-1.49) (-1.48) (-1.56) (-1.57) (-0.51) (-0.54) 
Firm size -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.0025** -0.0024** -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0036* -0.0036* 
 (-6.95) (-6.87) (-6.98) (-6.90) (-6.97) (-6.89) (-2.55) (-2.48) (-0.73) (-0.65) (-1.77) (-1.75) 
Free cash flow -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0034 -0.0036 -0.0025 -0.0026 0.0197 0.0199 0.0210 0.0211 0.0190 0.0194 
 (-0.22) (-0.23) (-0.29) (-0.31) (-0.21) (-0.22) (1.17) (1.18) (1.06) (1.06) (0.73) (0.74) 
ROA -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.046** -0.047** -0.017 -0.0175 
 (-2.88) (-2.89) (-2.81) (-2.82) (-2.89) (-2.90) (-2.71) (-2.73) (-2.43) (-2.43) (-0.46) (-0.48) 
Leverage 0.0038 0.0036 0.0037 0.0034 0.0036 0.0034 0.0088 0.0087 0.0098 0.0100 0.0029 0.0032 
 (0.74) (0.69) (0.71) (0.66) (0.70) (0.64) (1.02) (1.00) (0.99) (1.02) (0.17) (0.19) 
Tobin's q -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0018*** -0.0019*** -0.0011** -0.0011** -0.0015* -0.0016* 
 (-5.20) (-5.19) (-5.17) (-5.16) (-5.15) (-5.13) (-4.14) (-4.12) (-2.48) (-2.43) (-1.66) (-1.75) 
Industry competition 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 0.0007 0.0011** 0.0010** 0.0018** 0.0017** 0.0021** 0.0020** 0.0007 0.0005 
 (1.22) (1.00) (1.51) (1.34) (2.14) (1.97) (2.49) (2.34) (2.33) (2.20) (0.50) (0.35) 
Population -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0017* -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0007 
 (-1.59) (-1.37) (-1.57) (-1.30) (-1.47) (-1.20) (-1.68) (-1.37) (-1.36) (-1.04) (-0.52) (-0.37) 
Income -0.0341 -0.0316 -0.0419** -0.0392* -0.0363* -0.0332 -0.0014 0.0058 0.0004 0.0137 -0.0162 -0.0090 
 (-1.63) (-1.51) (-2.04) (-1.90) (-1.77) (-1.61) (-0.05) (0.21) (0.01) (0.38) (-0.38) (-0.22) 
Gender -0.0154* -0.0145 -0.0197** -0.0189** -0.0179** -0.0170* -0.0375*** -0.0359*** -0.0529*** -0.0520*** -0.0371 -0.0355 
 (-1.70) (-1.60) (-2.25) (-2.15) (-2.03) (-1.93) (-2.90) (-2.78) (-3.31) (-3.26) (-1.62) (-1.57) 
Religious -0.0042 -0.0013 -0.0071 -0.0037 -0.0077 -0.0042 -0.0023 0.0009 -0.0013 0.0033 0.0640** 0.0592* 
 (-0.49) (-0.14) (-0.84) (-0.42) (-0.90) (-0.47) (-0.19) (0.08) (-0.09) (0.21) (2.24) (1.81) 
Ethnicity -0.0087 -0.0086 -0.0095 -0.0095 -0.0090 -0.0089 -0.0030 -0.0036 -0.0006 -0.0014 0.0159 0.0164 
 (-0.99) (-0.99) (-1.09) (-1.09) (-1.03) (-1.02) (-0.22) (-0.26) (-0.04) (-0.10) (1.04) (1.08) 
MSA 0.0648*** 0.0699*** 0.0654*** 0.0706*** 0.0751*** 0.0812*** 0.0644*** 0.0745*** 0.0666*** 0.0821*** 0.0317 0.0530* 
 (4.61) (5.00) (4.54) (4.94) (5.39) (5.90) (3.13) (3.67) (2.87) (3.63) (0.96) (1.68) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,075 12,075 12,075 12,075 12,075 12,075 5,772 5,772 4,203 4,203 1,499 1,499 
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.14 
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Table 14. Presidential and Mid-term Elections 
  
The table reports the results of regression analysis with 5,180 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1981 
and 2009 where the acquiring firm is only a public and a target is a public, private or subsidiary.  Homogeneous 
acquisition (Dummy) is binary where 1 signifies that the acquirer and the target locals subscribe same political 
ideology determined with the recent president election and mid-term election outcomes. Homogeneous acquisition 
(continuous) is defined as the absolute value of difference between local political ideologies of acquirer and target in 
terms of margin of victory. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. All models are estimated with the year 
and industry fixed. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels, respectively.  The definitions 
of other variables are in the Appendix.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
          
Homogenous (Dummy) 0.0074**  0.0071**  
 (2.37)  (2.28)  
Homogeneous acquisition(Continuous)  -0.0182*  -0.0184* 
  (-1.68)  (-1.70) 
Geographical Distance   -0.0019 -0.0020* 
   (-1.56) (-1.66) 
Focus acquisition 0.0034 0.0035 0.0033 0.0038 
 (1.04) (1.06) (1.00) (1.17) 
Relative size 0.0025* 0.0025* 0.0024* 0.0025* 
 (1.84) (1.84) (1.89) (1.82) 
High tech -0.0113*** -0.0112*** -0.0108** -0.0120*** 
 (-2.65) (-2.64) (-2.52) (-2.84) 
Public target -0.0395*** -0.0396*** -0.0394*** -0.0323*** 
 (-8.60) (-8.61) (-8.48) (-8.43) 
Tender offer 0.0063** 0.0062** 0.0057* 0.0080*** 
 (2.02) (2.00) (1.82) (2.64) 
Deal attitude(Friendly) 0.0138*** 0.0139*** 0.0141*** 0.0128** 
 (2.71) (2.74) (2.78) (2.53) 
Firm age -0.0157* -0.0160* -0.0170* -0.0152* 
 (-1.79) (-1.83) (-1.90) (-1.73) 
Firm size -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0032 
 (-1.58) (-1.58) (-1.59) (-1.47) 
Free cash flow -0.0059*** -0.0058*** -0.0058*** -0.0055*** 
 (-5.47) (-5.40) (-5.31) (-5.10) 
ROA 0.0025 0.0024 0.0041 0.0034 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.20) (0.18) 
Leverage -0.0319* -0.0320* -0.0352* -0.0334* 
 (-1.75) (-1.76) (-1.90) (-1.83) 
Tobin's q 0.0096 0.0096 0.0098 0.0102 
 (1.02) (1.02) (1.02) (1.09) 
Industry competition -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** 
 (-3.75) (-3.68) (-3.72) (-3.74) 
Population -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 (-0.20) (-0.41) (0.41) (0.35) 
Income -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0008 
 (-1.12) (-0.92) (-0.86) (-0.76) 
Gender -0.0579* -0.0553* -0.0593** -0.0501 
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 (-1.95) (-1.83) (-1.98) (-1.64) 
Religious -0.0035 -0.0033 0.0044 0.0015 
 (-0.25) (-0.24) (0.31) (0.11) 
Ethnicity -0.0269* -0.0244 -0.0256* -0.0238 
 (-1.87) (-1.64) (-1.78) (-1.61) 
MSA 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0004 
 (0.01) (-0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
Constant 0.0991*** 0.1075*** 0.1026*** 0.0967*** 
 (4.49) (4.93) (4.63) (4.65) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,180 5,180 5,180 5,180 
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
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Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
CEO characteristics   
Conservative CEO 
Defined as the difference between the CEO’s political contributions to Republican 
and Democratic party-affiliated candidates or party committees divided by the CEO’s 
total contribution s to Republican and Democrat-affiliated committees.(Hutton, Jiang 
and Kumar(2011) 
Conservative CEO 
dummy Binary where 1 signifies that the CEO donates only to Republicans 
CEO age Log of CEO age in the given year 
CEO tenure 
Log of the number of years the CEO had held his/her current position in a given year 
with a given firm 
Gender Binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO is female 
Founder Binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO is founder 
Overconfident CEO Binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEOs hold stock options that are more than 
67% in the money (Malmendier and Tate(2005) and Campbell et al (2011)) 
Firm characteristics   
Firm size Log of book value of total assets (item6). 
Book leverage 
Book value of debts (item34 + item9) over market value of total assets 
(item6−item60 + item25 ∗ item199). 
Cash holdings Cash and short term investments(Item1) divided by total assets(Item6) 
R&D expenditures 
R&D expenditures (Item46) divided by total assets (Item6). Missing values are 
substituted with zero, unless indicated 
Capital expenditures Capital expenditures divided by total assets(Item6) 
Tobin's Q 
Market value of assets over book value of assets: (item6−item60 + item25 ∗ 
item199)/item6. 
Free cash flow 
Operating income before depreciation (item13) – interest expenses (item15) – 
income taxes (item16) – capital  expenditures (item128), scaled by book value of 
total assets (item6) 
High tech 
Binary variable where 1 signifies that acquirer and target are both from high tech 
industries whose SICs are in 
3571,3572,3575,3577,3578,3661,3663,3669,3674,3812,3823,3825, 
3826,3827,3829,3841,3845,4812,4813,4899,7370,7371,7372,7373,7374,7375,7378,7
379. This classification is defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
Sales Growth Sales(Item12) divided by lag sales 
Profitability 
Operating income before depreciation(item13)+Total interest rate and related 
expense(Item15)-Deferred taxes and investment tax credit(Item35) divided by total 
asset(Item6) 
Operating margin Operating income before depreciation(item13) divided by sales(Item12) 
ROA Operating income before depreciation(item13) divided by total asset(Item6) 
Industry competition Measured by the Herfindahl index 
Tangibility Total property, plant and equipment(Item 141) divided by total assets(Item6) 
Deal Characteristics   
Public target Binary variable where 1 signifies 1 that  the target is public 
Private target Binary variable where 1 signifies1 that the target is private 
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Subsidiary target Binary variable where 1 signifies1 that  the target is subsidiary 
Cash payment Binary variable where 1 signifies that the payment is cash 
Stock payment Binary variable where 1 signifies that he payment is cash 
Focus 
Binary variable where I signifies that  the first 2 digits of SICs of the acquirer and the 
target are same 
Relative value Deal value (from SDC) over bidder market value of equity defined above 
Deal attitude Binary variable where 1 signifies when the deal is defined as "friendly" 
Tender Binary variable where 1 signifies when a tender offer is launched for the target 
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Appendix 2:  Definitions of variables 
Variables Definitions 
  
Homogeneous acquisition(Dummy) Dummy variable where 1 signifies that the acquirer and the target locals 
subscribe same political ideology determined with the recent president 
election outcomes 
Homogeneous acquisition(Continuous) Defined as the absolute value of difference between local political 
ideologies of acquirer and target in terms of margin of victory 
In-state Dummy variable where 1 signifies that the acquirer and the target are 
located in same state in a given year 
Local Dummy variable  where 1 signifies that the acquirer and target are 
located within 100km of each other in a given year 
Geographical distance A continuous variable defined in Uysal, et al. (2008) 
 
 
 
Firm size Log of book value of total assets (item6). 
Market capitalization Market value of equity (millions of 2005 $) 
Book leverage Book value of debts (item34 + item9) over market value of total assets 
(item6−item60 + item25 ∗ item199). 
Cash holdings Cash/assets 
R&D expenditures R&D expenditures/lagged assets. Missing values are substituted with 
zero, unless indicated 
Capital expenditures Capital expenditures/lagged assets 
Return on assets (ROA) Operating income before depreciation/lagged assets 
Tobin's Q Market value of assets over book value of assets: (item6−item60 + 
item25 ∗ item199)/item6. 
Free cash flow Operating income before depreciation (item13) – interest expenses 
(item15) – income taxes (item16) – capital  expenditures (item128), 
scaled by book value of total assets (item6) 
CAR (−2, +2) Five-day cumulative abnormal return calculated using the market 
adjusted model with the CRSP value-weighted return as the market 
index.  
  
Public target Dummy variable: 1 for public targets, 0 otherwise. 
Private target Dummy variable: 1 for private targets, 0 otherwise. 
Cash payment Dummy variable: 1 for purely cash-financed deals, 0 otherwise. 
Stock payment Dummy variable: 1 for purely stock-financed deals, 0 otherwise 
Relative deal size Deal value (from SDC) over bidder market value of equity defined 
above 
High tech Dummy variable: 1 if bidder and target are both from high tech 
industries defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004), 0 otherwise. 
Focus Dummy variable where I signifies that  the first 2 digits of SICs of the 
acquirer and the target are same 
Deal attitude Dummy variable where 1 signifies when the deal is defined as 
"friendly" 
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Tender Dummy variable where 1 signifies when a tender offer is launched for 
the target 
  
  
Population Difference between log of local populations of acquirers and target in a 
given year (Data: CENSUS) 
Education Difference between log of local education of acquirers and target in a 
given year (Data: CENSUS) 
Income Difference between log of local median household income of acquirers 
and target in a given year (Data: CENSUS) 
Gender Difference between local female ratios of acquirers and target in a given 
year (Data: CENSUS) 
Ethnicity Difference between local race ratios of acquirers and target in a given 
year (Data: CENSUS) 
Religious A continuous variable to estimate local religious environment (Hilary 
and Hui (2009) 
MSA Dummy variable where 1 signifies when local is a metropolitan 
statistical area  
 
 
